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The presumption against extraterritoriality tells courts to read a territorial
limit into statutes that are ambiguous about their geographic reach. This
canon of construction has deep roots in Anglo-American law, and the U.S.
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principle of statutory interpretation in
Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Yet as explained in this Article, none of the purported justifications for the
presumption against extraterritoriality hold water. Older decisions look to
international law or conflict-of-laws principles, but these bodies of law have
changed such that they no longer support a territorial rule. Modern courts
suggest that the presumption avoids conflicts with foreign states and
approximates legislative attention, yet these same decisions show the
presumption is poorly attuned to either of these laudable goals. And while
* Lecturer in Law and Public Law Fellow, University of Chicago Law School. I am
grateful for the assistance of Judge Diane P. Wood, Stephen B. Burbank, Daniel Abebe,
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separation ofpowers and due process are superficially served by this rule, they
too crumble in the face of serious scrutiny.
Although courts continue to rely on this outmoded presumption, some
scholars have noted the incongruity between its goals and its execution. These
scholars have offered alternative rules such as a presumption against
extrajurisdictionality or a dual-illegality rule. But these alternative proposals
fall into the same trap as the presumption - they uncritically apply a single
approach to all types of cases. Instead, different statute types call for different
rules: the Charming Betsy doctrine for private civil litigation, a rule of lenity
for criminal statutes, and Chevron deference for administrative cases. These
rules, not a singular presumption, best support the public policy interests that
are important in each of these classes of disputes, and they also suggest an
approach to Alien Tort Statute litigation that could serve as an alternative to
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kiobel.
INTRODUCTION
The presumption against extraterritoriality has been applied in U.S. courts
for more than a century, receiving perhaps its most prominent endorsement
from no less than Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: "[A]II legislation is
primafacie territorial."' In the 1990s, Chief Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed this
principle in its modem formulation: "[L]egislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States."'2 And in 2013, Chief Justice Roberts quoted Justice
Scalia for the proposition that: "When a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none." 3
As these Justices explained, and as its name suggests, the presumption
against extraterritoriality instructs courts to construe geoambiguous statutes to
apply only to the territory of the United States.4 The presumption against
extraterritoriality has been cited in hundreds of reported decisions,5 and the
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (quoting Exparte Blain,
(1879) 12 Ch.D. 522, 528 (Brett, L.J.) (Eng.).
2 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley
Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
3 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting Morrison
v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010)).
1 See Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for
Extraterritorial Application of US. Law, 95 MINN. L. REv. 110, 114 (2010) (coining, to the
Author's knowledge, the term "geoambiguous" to refer to laws that are "silent about
whether they apply to acts that occur outside of the United States").
5 For example, a search in the "allfeds" database on Westlaw on December 2, 2013 for
"(presumption /2 extraterritoriality) or (canon /2 extraterritoriality) or (presumption /2
territorial!)" returned 260 federal court decisions.
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Supreme Court has continued to "wholeheartedly embrace" the presumption
against extraterritoriality in transnational litigation in U.S. courts.6
Judicial and scholarly advocates point to a range of justifications for the
presumption against extraterritoriality: it reflects international law and conflict-
of-laws principles, 7 it insulates U.S. foreign relations interests by minimizing
conflicts with foreign laws, 8 it approximates congressional intent,9 it maintains
the separation of powers among the coordinate branches, 10 and it protects due
process rights of defendants. l Each of these goals is laudable, but the
presumption against extraterritoriality is a crude tool to achieve these ends and
at times it is counterproductive for its stated purposes. 12 For these reasons, the
presumption against extraterritoriality merits reevaluation. Part I of this Article
takes up that task.
The examination of the presumption and its purposes is important for a few
reasons. The presumption against extraterritoriality is a widely cited judicial
rule, and it affects topics from securities regulation 13 to employment
discrimination 4 to piracy.' 5 These decisions have consequences for regulated
individuals and entities, and for those protected by such laws. The question of
extraterritoriality further connects with foreign relations issues that have
consequences for the United States and for foreign states. Interpretative rules
also have dynamic effects. 16 The behavior of legislators, regulators, and
prosecutors is colored by the background rules established by courts, so ideally
those background rules will be grounded in a justified normative foundation.
More generally, transnational litigation and policy are significant. Professor
Harold Koh, for example, has noted a recent emphasis on issues of
6 Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877).
7 Infra Part I.A.
8 Infra Part I.B. 1.
9 Infra Part I.B.2.
10 Infra Part 1.C. I.
11 Infra Part I.C.2.
12 Infra Part I.
13 E.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877-83 (2010) (applying
the presumption to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-
pp (2012)).
14 E.g., Ararnco, 499 U.S. 244, 248-59 (1991) (applying the presumption to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (2006)).
'5 E.g., United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 630-35 (1818) (limiting the
extraterritorial effect of a U.S. statute prohibiting piracy); United States v. Hasan, 747 F.
Supp. 2d 599, 602-42 (E.D. Va. 2010) (discussing the history, doctrine, and theory related to
the extraterritorial scope of piracy legislation).
16 See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions,
101 MICH. L. REv. 885 (2003) (discussing inter alia dynamic effects and statutory
interpretation).
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extraterritoriality, which he attributes to an increase in transnational economic
activity, the transnational interests of nation states, and the rise of transnational
regulation. 7 The presumption against extraterritoriality is one significant piece
of this transnational legal landscape.
Part I of this Article marshals evidence that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is ill-suited for its purported purposes. These specific
criticisms also reveal a deeper concern with current approaches to
extraterritoriality. Although courts may adopt truly transsubstantive rules
without exceptions, courts must make judgments about both the content of the
rule and the scope of its application for many areas of statutory interpretation
and procedure. Decisions about a rule's application reflect choices about the
nature of cases; like cases should be treated more alike than unlike ones. The
presumption against extraterritoriality reflects a judgment of this kind: it
assumes that cases meeting the definition of "extraterritorial"' 8 are enough
alike to be treated similarly for purposes of determining prescriptive
jurisdiction.' 9 Scholarly proposals to replace the presumption against
extraterritoriality track this conclusion, suggesting alternative rules to apply in
all extraterritorial cases. 20 And a wider literature about foreign relations law
takes as a given that "foreign relations cases" - whatever that term means -
should be treated as a unified category. 21 But this conclusion is not required.
Instead, at least with respect to the presumption against extraterritoriality, the
relevant values may be best served by first considering other aspects of the
case.
Part II of this Article applies this insight and the purposes identified in Part I
to frame a new approach to extraterritoriality and related cases. Unlike the
aforementioned alternatives, the approach in Part II treats statute type rather
than territory as the first cut. Once statutes are divided into civil, criminal, and
administrative, then social values are more easily pursued. Indeed, Part II
shows that the relevant values are served by existing case-type-specific
doctrines of statutory interpretation: the Charming Betsy doctrine for private
civil litigation, 22 the rule of lenity in criminal statutes,23 and Chevron deference
in administrative cases.24 Part II explains that these rules, rather than the
presumption, should govern extraterritorial cases in those three areas.
17 HAROLD HONGIU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 52
(2008).
18 See infra note 43 (discussing definitions of extraterritoriality).
19 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401
(1986) (defining prescriptive (or legislative) jurisdiction).
20 See infra Part II.
21 This issue is discussed further below. See infra notes 205 & 276.
22 See infra Part II.A.
23 See infra Part II.B.
24 See infra Part II.C.
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Having laid out these replacements, Part III looks to a statute that is highly
salient in international litigation though not covered by these three categories.
The Alien Tort Statute provides for federal court jurisdiction for international
law torts,2 5 and in recent years courts and scholars have debated its operation
in extraterritorial cases. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to
the Alien Tort Statute,26 but not without criticism from dissenting Justices and
the academy. 27 Part III asks whether the rules laid out for substantive statutes
in Part II have something to say about this jurisdictional statute that raises
similar structural and international concerns.28
This Article concludes with comments about where extraterritoriality fits
within existing theoretical approaches to foreign relations law, statutory
interpretation, and procedure. In sum, this Article demonstrates that the
presumption of extraterritoriality, while supposedly serving commendable
goals, falls short. We need not, however, look far for alternative rules, as long
as we acknowledge that the cases to which courts have applied the
presumption demand more than a one-size-fits-all response.
I. THE PRESUMPTION AND ITS PURPOSES
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a judge-made rule of statutory
interpretation. Over the years, courts and scholars have justified the
presumption with respect to various interests and values.29 This Part addresses
each of the purported justifications for this rule. Before doing so, though, it is
helpful to supplement the Introduction's brief comments about the
presumption's operation.
The presumption against extraterritoriality instructs courts that "legislation
of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. '30 This rule is a tool of federal
statutory interpretation. It is not a constitutional principle, 31 and it does not
25 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.").
26 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663-69 (2013).
27 See infra notes 251-59 and accompanying text.
28 See infra Part III.
29 See generally Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law,
24 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1992); Zachary D. Clopton, Bowman Lives: The
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Criminal Law After Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 137 (2011); William S. Dodge, Understanding the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85 (1998); John H. Knox,
A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 351 (2010).
30 Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949)).
31 See infra Part I.C.
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govern the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution.32 It does not speak to the
role of U.S. states in foreign affairs - it addresses only federal laws.33 Nor does
it address legislative authority, as courts have placed virtually no limits on the
power of Congress to legislate outside the borders of the United States. 34 And,
at least until 2013, the presumption has not been applied to common law
causes of actions, but instead has been a tool to construe statutes.35
Within these limits, courts apply the presumption to substantive federal
statutes, both civil and criminal.36 Some statutes are expressly extraterritorial,
making the interpretation question a nonissue. For example, if you were to
operate a stateless submersible vessel on the high seas with the intent to evade
detection, you may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2285(a). 37 Less obscure
examples are available, but this editorial choice is meant to suggest that
express extraterritoriality is far from routine; most statutes do not include
32 These issues are discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE
CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW
95 (2009).
33 For a discussion of the relationship between the related Charming Betsy canon and
state law, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Interpretative Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 533-36 (1997).
The Charming Betsy canon is also discussed infra Part II.A.
34 According to a leading textbook, "no reported federal court decision has held an
extraterritorial application of substantive U.S. law unconstitutional." GARY B. BORN &
PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 607
(Vicki Been et al. eds., 5th ed. 2011); see also Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 ("Both parties
concede, as they must, that Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the
territorial boundaries of the United States."); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 579 n.7
(1953) (noting that the Court always follows the dictates of Congress, assuming
constitutionality). The Eleventh Circuit recently held, however, that the Offense Clause of
the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, did not authorize the extraterritorial
application of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a), 70506
(2006), though it did not rule on other potential constitutional bases for the law. United
States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1248-58 (1 1th Cir. 2012).
35 But see infra Part III (discussing common law causes of action under the Alien Tort
Statute).
36 See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 29 (discussing the application of the presumption in
criminal cases).
37 Section 2285(a) provides that:
Whoever knowingly operates, or attempts or conspires to operate, by any means, or
embarks in any submersible vessel or semi-submersible vessel that is without
nationality and that is navigating or has navigated into, through, or from waters beyond
the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single country or a lateral limit of that country's
territorial sea with an adjacent country, with the intent to evade detection, shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2285(a) (2012). For a catalog of U.S. criminal laws with extraterritorial reach,
see CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW (2012).
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express language on territorial scope, leaving courts to decide the ambiguous
statute's reach. The presumption against extraterritoriality tries to aid in this
judgment.
Courts implement the presumption by addressing two questions. First, is
there a "contrary intent" of Congress that would justify overcoming the
presumption against extraterritoriality? At various times, judges have
examined the text of statutes, related statutory provisions, the statutes'
purposes, legislative history, and the governmental interest to determine
whether Congress admitted any such contrary intent.38 Although the Supreme
Court insists the presumption is not a clear statement rule,3 9 recent cases have
approached this bright-line requirement.4
0
A second interpretative issue is, in some sense, antecedent to the application
of the presumption. The previous question asked whether Congress intended a
statute to apply extraterritorially, but nothing in the canonical statement of the
presumption tells courts what qualifies as an extraterritorial case. To put it
another way, if a case has some connection to the United States and some
connection to a foreign state, courts must determine whether the case is
"extraterritorial" (and thus subject to the presumption) or not (thus rendering
the presumption irrelevant).41 Justice Scalia colorfully wrote that the
presumption against extraterritoriality is not a "craven watchdog...
retreat[ing] to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the
case."4 2 Not all extraterritorial connections, therefore, invoke the presumption,
and not all domestic connections defeat it. Courts and scholars have offered
manifold formulations of which connections are sufficient, and in many cases
the answer is not entirely clear.4
3
38 Dodge, supra note 29, at 110-12, 123-24. For a taxonomy of these sources in criminal
cases, see Clopton, supra note 29.
39 See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010) ("But we do not
say, as the concurrence seems to think, that the presumption against extraterritoriality is a
'clear statement rule'....").
40 See id. at 2891 (Stevens, J., concurring) (characterizing the majority as "transform[ing]
the presumption from a flexible rule of thumb into something more like a clear statement
rule"); Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991) ("Congress' awareness of the need to make a
clear statement that a statute applies overseas ...." (emphasis added)); id at 261-66
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's clear-statement approach).
41 See Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, para. 63 (Can.) (referring to such a
case as "both here and there").
42 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
41 In Morrison, Justice Scalia looked to the "focus" of the statute, while Justice Stevens
relied on the Second Circuit's conduct-or-effects approach. Compare id. at 2884-86
(majority opinion), with id. at 2888-95 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Canadian
courts look for a real and substantial connection to Canada. Libman, [1985] 2 S.C.R. at para.
74. Australian courts have not settled on a rule, though a recent decision mentioned more
than half a dozen alternatives. Lipohar v The Queen, [1999] 200 CLR 485 (Austl.). See
generally Zachary D. Clopton, Extraterritoriality and Extranationality: A Comparative
2014]
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Having briefly outlined the presumption against extraterritoriality, the
remainder of this Part addresses its purported bases drawn from case law and
scholarly treatments: international law, foreign law, congressional attention,
separation of powers, and due process.
A. Historical Justifications
The presumption against extraterritoriality has its historical roots in the
emphasis on territorial sovereignty in international law. This focus on
territoriality supported a presumption against extraterritoriality directly, and
led to a conflict-of-laws approach that also supported a territorial presumption.
Territorial sovereignty was an important principle in nineteenth-century
international law, and on issues from personal jurisdiction 44 to foreign
sovereign immunity45 to choice of law,46 it had a profound effect on U.S. law.
In Pennoyer v. Neff, a case likely familiar to any current or former student of
Civil Procedure, the Court relied on international law principles to conclude
that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons
and property within its territory" and that "no State can exercise direct
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory. '47
This international law emphasis on territorial sovereignty has been cited as a
motivating principle behind the presumption against extraterritoriality.48
Proponents of this view rely on the famed decision in The Apollon case, citing
fondly its admonition that "[t]he laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its
own territories. '49 Indirectly, this territorial view of international law supported
a territorial principle in conflict of laws - specifically, the "vested rights"
approach - which was the basis of Justice Holmes's original articulation of the
presumption in American Banana.50
Study, 23 DUKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 217 (2013) (discussing the American, Canadian, and
Australian approaches). For criticism of the indeterminacy of Morrison's rule, see Lea
Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Legislative
Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40
Sw. L. REv. 655, 669-72 (2011); John H. Knox, The Unpredictable Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 40 Sw. L. REv. 635 (2011) (arguing that the presumption does not
approximate legislative intent).
4 E.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
45 E.g., The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
46 E.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824).
4 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
48 For additional discussion of this justification, compare Born, supra note 29, at 59-71,
with Dodge, supra note 29, at 113-14.
4' The Apollon, 22 U.S. at 370.
50 Am. Banana v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-59 (1909). Under the vested-rights
approach, "the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the
law of the country where the act is done." Id. at 356. For further discussion of the vested-
rights approach, see, for example, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934); JOSEPH
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The emphasis on territoriality was drawn from international law at the time,
but even in the era of Pennoyer and American Banana, territoriality did not tell
the whole story. States could and did regulate extraterritorial conduct under
certain conditions. The quotation from The Apollon about territoriality comes
with a qualification - in full, the Court said "[t]he laws of no nation can justly
extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its own citizens."51
Justice Story also acknowledged the nonexclusivity of territoriality in his
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws: "[T]he laws of a nation have no direct,
binding force, or effect, except upon persons within its territories; yet every
nation has a right to bind its own subjects by its own laws in every other
place." 52 Today, the case for extraterritorial jurisdiction is even clearer. The
modem international law of prescriptive jurisdiction 53 permits legislative
authority with respect to (among others) nationality, effects, and, at times,
universal jurisdiction.54 International law may be the basis for a canon of
interpretation, perhaps most importantly because international law reflects the
consent of states to which it applies - reflecting the notion of sovereign
equality in the international system. But because international law does not
(and perhaps never did) rely on territory as the sole basis of prescriptive
jurisdiction, it cannot be said to support a presumption against
extraterritoriality. 55
H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 307 (1935). For further information on
conflict of laws more generally, see, for example, R. LEA BRILMAYER ET AL., CONFLICT OF
LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2011).
"' The Apollon, 22 U.S. at 370 (emphasis added).
52 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 22 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray
& Co. 1834).
53 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401
(1986) (defining prescriptive (or legislative) jurisdiction as the power "to make its law
applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in
things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or
regulation, or by determination of a court"). For further discussion of the international law
of prescriptive jurisdiction, see infra Part II.A.
54 E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§
402, 404 (1986) (discussing international law bases ofjurisdiction).
15 The same can be said for conflict of laws. As noted above, the presumption against
extraterritoriality was based on the vested-rights approach to conflicts. Supra note 50. But
vested rights' primacy was a casualty of the "conflicts revolution." See, e.g., Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 707-10 (2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF
LAWS ch. 7 intro, note (1971) (discussing the change from the "place of wrong" rule to the
"most significant relationship" test for torts); BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAW 74-76 (1963); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American
Courts in 2010: Twenty-Fourth Annual Survey, 59 AM. J. COM. L. 303, 305-06 (2011);
Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L.
REv. 927, 928-41 (1975) (discussing evolution of conflict-of-laws thinking). By displacing
the consensus around vested rights, the conflicts revolution allowed courts to account for
2014]
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Substantive (rather than jurisdictional) international law also challenges the
presumption. Responding to an influx of Haitians traveling by boat to the
United States, the President directed the Coast Guard to intercept such vessels
and return the passengers to Haiti without determining whether they qualified
as refugees. A legal challenge asked the Supreme Court to determine whether
procedural protections for putative refugees in the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) applied beyond the United States' territorial waters. 56 In Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, the Supreme Court used the presumption against
extraterritoriality to conclude that the INA did not afford such protections
extraterritorially. 57 In dissent, Justice Blackmun observed that reliance on the
presumption sanctioned conduct that violated substantive international law -
the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the
United States acceded in 1968.58 This is not to say that U.S. courts should
enforce the Protocol directly, but it is noteworthy that a rule purportedly
effectuating international law (the presumption against extraterritoriality) ran
counter to a substantive international law commitment. Both substantive and
jurisdictional international law, therefore, counsel against a strict territorial
presumption.
B. Modern Justifications
The presumption against extraterritoriality rose in an era in which
territoriality was more central to international law and conflict of laws than it is
today, not to mention a time in which the nature, scope, and quantity of
extraterritorial regulation was significantly different. Courts looking at these
developments could have changed the presumption. But instead their response
has been to change the justifications for the rule. Courts in recent years have
put less emphasis on international law and vested rights in extraterritorial
cases, instead focusing primarily on two other justifications: the desire to avoid
conflicts with foreign laws and legislative attention. 59 This Section addresses
these themes in turn.
factors, such as forum-state interest, that go beyond mere territorial connections. See, e.g.,
CURRIE, supra, at 74-76. For further discussion of conflict of laws and the presumption, see
Born, supra note 29, at 71-74; Dodge, supra note 29, at 114-15.
56 Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. §
1253(h) (2012)).
57 Id at 173-74.
58 Id. at 188 (discussing the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
19 U.S.T. 6223 (Jan. 31, 1967)).
59 See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 29, at 151-55 (discussing justifications and observing
that foreign-law conflicts and legislative attention receive the most consideration from
modern courts); Dodge, supra note 29, at 112-23 (same).
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1. Foreign Conflicts
U.S. courts often justify the presumption against extraterritoriality as
avoiding foreign conflicts. 60 Importantly, this justification refers to foreign
law, not international law, meaning that it is concerned about conflicts with the
laws of individual foreign states. One could imagine, for example, situations
where complying with U.S. laws would put foreign parties in violation of their
country's domestic laws. 61
In the most general sense, the presumption against extraterritoriality reduces
conflicts with foreign laws in that any rule that disposes of any cases in U.S.
courts could have the effect of disposing of some cases that may present
conflicts with foreign laws. But it proves too much to say that any dismissal-
oriented rule is justified by foreign conflicts. If the risk of foreign conflicts
really justifies the presumption, there should be congruence between the rule
and its purported purpose.
First, the presumption against extraterritoriality is overinclusive with respect
to foreign conflict avoidance. For one thing, courts do not routinely consider
the intensity of the potential conflict when applying the presumption. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has applied the presumption against extraterritoriality
where there was definitively no conflict with foreign laws. In this connection, I
am not referring to the Court affirmatively declaring "no conflict" - though
such a case exists. 62 Rather, I refer here to Smith v. United States. 63 In Smith,
the spouse of a carpenter killed while working on a National Science
Foundation project brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The
interesting wrinkle was that the suit arose from events in Antarctica. Antarctica
is not a foreign sovereign, and there is no domestic law of Antarctica. 64 In
other words, there is no foreign law with which to conflict. Despite this fact,
the Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to dismiss the
I E.g., Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (discussing the desire to avoid unintended
clashes with American laws and foreign nations); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963) (characterizing the decision as avoiding
conflict with the laws of Honduras); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922)
(expressing concern with doing offense to the sovereignty of Brazil). Others have further
justified this discussion. See Born, supra note 29, at 76-79; Dodge, supra note 29, at 115-17;
Knox, supra note 29, at 379-83. This Section assumes that avoiding conflicts is desirable, a
proposition that scholars like Professor Dodge dispute. See Dodge, supra note 29, at 117.
61 The Rogers case discussed this issue in the context of discovery obligations. See
generally Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S. A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
62 Sale, 509 U.S. at 173-74 (stating that the presumption applies even though there was
no risk that the statute could conflict with foreign law).
63 Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 199 (1993).
4 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia further discussed Antarctica and
extraterritoriality in a 1993 decision. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 529
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
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suit.65 In a similar vein, Professor John Knox noted disapprovingly that U.S.
courts have used the presumption to avoid applying statutes to areas within the
exclusive control of the United States (for example, military bases or
vessels). 66 Not only would such application present no risk of foreign conflict
(since there would be no foreign law with which to conflict), but these
situations also may create new conflicts by establishing "under-regulated
zones" for which the United States is internationally responsible. 67
At the same time, the presumption against extraterritoriality is also an
underinclusive conflict-prevention device because it fails to account for
nonterritorial bases of jurisdiction. Even if a U.S. court was applying U.S. law
territorially, it could conflict with a foreign law asserting a nonterritorial basis.
For example, territoriality and nationality could lead to conflicts; a conflict
could arise when one party is a foreign national and her state has exercised
nationality jurisdiction. The presumption against extraterritoriality says
nothing of these conflicts.
The foreign-conflicts justification is further undermined because the
presumption against extraterritoriality, on its face, ignores available conflict-
related information. Most obviously, courts could inquire into the content of
foreign law in order to assess the presence of a conflict. Justice Souter took this
approach in his comity analysis in Hartford Fire,68 as would any practitioner of
interest-analysis brands of conflict of laws.69 But this inquiry is not part of the
presumption against extraterritoriality; the presumption is applied entirely from
the perspective of the forum state. Further, although Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained that the foreign-conflicts concern sought to avoid "international
discord," 70 the presumption is devoid of any attention to the views of foreign
states or the U.S. diplomatic corps. 7 1
65 Id. at 530-37.
66 Knox, supra note 29, at 379-83, 390-92.
67 Id. at 380.
61 Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993) ("[l]ntemational comity
would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in the circumstances alleged here.").
69 See generally supra note 55.
70 Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
71 See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701-02 (2004) (suggesting that the
views of the executive may carry some weight in sovereign immunity cases). In some
foreign sovereign immunity cases, the executive branch files a statement of interest with a
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2012).It is also notable that the Supreme Court's recent
endorsement of the "focus test" for extraterritoriality was coupled with an invocation of the
foreign-conflicts justification. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884-85
(2010) (justifying the focus test with reference to "[t]he probability of incompatibility with
the applicable laws of other countries"). Yet, when given the opportunity to announce a rule
to define cases as "extraterritorial," the Court selected a rule that exclusively relates to the
forum state; the Court inquired into the focus of the domestic statute without any
consideration of foreign laws or interests. Id. at 2884 (looking only at the "focus" of the
Exchange Act to determine if it applies extraterritorially).
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In sum, although the presumption against extraterritoriality may result in the
dismissal of some cases in which there may be conflicts with foreign laws, the
rule is both under- and overinclusive in this regard. Foreign conflicts alone,
therefore, would be a thin reed on which to base such a robust rule.
2. Congressional Attention
The second modem justification for the presumption is congressional
attention. According to the Supreme Court, the presumption against
extraterritoriality is a useful rule of thumb because "Congress is primarily
concerned with domestic conditions. ' '72 At least one leading scholar suggested
that this notion is the only plausible justification for the presumption against
extraterritoriality.7 3 Genuflections to this domestic-concern argument can be
found in judicial opinions not only from U.S. courts but also from various
other countries that apply a territorial presumption. 74
The Supreme Court has not explained why it believes Congress's attention
is primarily territorial. Chief Justice Rehnquist claimed it is "commonsense. ' '75
Why? In many circumstances, Congress may be agnostic: as Professor Lea
Brilmayer put it, "in the vast majority of cases, legislatures have no actual
intent on territorial reach. '76 In many situations, common sense suggests the
opposite assumption; one could easily imagine situations in which Congress
would legislate with foreign conduct in mind. In Justice Blackmun's view, the
logic of the presumption "has less force - perhaps, indeed, no force at all -
when a statute on its face relates to foreign affairs. '77 On topics from drug
trafficking78 to bribery of foreign officials 79 to genocide,80 it would be odd to
think that Congress was not at least considering foreign conduct.
72 Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); see also Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at
2877 (same); id. at 2892 (Stevens, J., concurring) (same); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S.
197, 204 n.5 (1993) (same); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 585 (1992)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (same); Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (same).
73 Dodge, supra note 29, at 90, 117-19.
74 E.g., Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, 183 (Can.) ("States ordinarily have
little interest in prohibiting activities that occur abroad .... ); R. v. Martin, [1956] 2 All
E.R. 86, 92-93 (Eng.) (declining to apply English criminal law outside the territory of the
state).
71 Smith, 507 U.S. at 204 n.5 (noting that the presumption against extraterritoriality
reflects the "commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns
in mind").
76 Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REv.
392, 393 (1980) (emphasis omitted).
77 Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 207 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
78 See United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1304-06 (11th Cir. 2000) (inferring
extraterritorial intent in the drug smuggling statute and collecting cases doing the same).
79 Indeed, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is expressly extraterritorial. 15 U.S.C. §
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Congressional responses to the Supreme Court also undermine this domestic
assumption. In Arabian American Oil ("Aramco"), the Supreme Court assumed
Congress was concerned with domestic conditions when it passed Title VII,
and therefore the Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to
that statute.8' Within the year, Congress amended Title VII to have
extraterritorial effect.82 Similarly, after the Supreme Court rejected the
extraterritorial application of securities law in 2010,83 Congress overruled the
Court's decision one month later.84 Even the famed piracy case United States
v. Palmer,85 relied on by modem adherents to the presumption,86 was overruled
by Congress a year after it was decided.87 Apparently, the presumption against
78dd-1(g)(1) (2012) (prohibiting certain conduct "outside the United States").
80 The current criminal genocide statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (2012), applies
extraterritorially, but it did not do so prior to 2007. See Act of Dec. 21, 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-151, sec. 2, § 1091(d), 121 Stat. 1821, 1821-22 (2007) (amending the statute).
81 499 U.S. 244, 248, 255-59 (1991).
82 Act of Nov. 21, 1991, Pub. L. No. 10-166, sec. 109, §§ 701(f), 702, 101(8), 102, 105
Stat. 1071, 1077-78. Indeed, Members of Congress waited less than one month to introduce
legislation to overrule this decision. E.g., Extraterritorial Employment Protection
Amendments of 1991, H.R. 1741, 102d Cong. (1991) (amending the Civil Rights Act to
apply the law in some instances to United States citizens employed in foreign nations);
American Employees Equity Act of 1991, H.R. 1694, 102d Cong. § 2(d) (1991) (amending
the Civil Rights Act to ensure that Title VII applies to some United States citizens employed
in foreign nations). Further, as Gary Born notes, Congress also acted to amend the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act in the face of lower court decisions rejecting its
extraterritorial application. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
634 (2012); Born, supra note 29, at 75 n.376.
83 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010) (concluding that
because "there is no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that 10(b) applies
extraterritorially," the presumptions against extraterritoriality applies).
84 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act amended the
Securities Exchange Acts to expressly provide for the extraterritorial enforcement of certain
securities laws by SEC. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 929P(b)(l)-(2), §§ 22,
27, 124 Stat. 1376, 1864-65 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77v(c) (2012) & 15 U.S.C. §
78aa(b)).
85 United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818) (discussing the application of
the U.S. piracy statute outside the United States).
86 E.g., Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388 (2005) (arguing that "any person" does
not necessarily include persons outside the jurisdiction (citing Palmer, 16 U.S. at 631));
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577 (1953) (interpreting Palmer to indicate that laws
should not apply the presumption of extraterritorially when the legislature did not
specifically endorse international application).
87 See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 612-13 (E.D. Va. 2010) (citing Act
of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 510; ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 158-59 (2d ed.
1998)). Notably, among these three cases in which Congress expressly rejected the Supreme
Court's assumption that it was only concerned with domestic conditions - specifically with
respect to employment discrimination, securities fraud, and piracy - two of them relate to
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extraterritoriality, which supposedly manifests legislative intent, does not
always hit Congress's mark.
The congressional-attention justification also faces a conceptual problem - it
is unclear what exactly courts mean when they say Congresg is concerned with
domestic conditions. Does this refer to domestic conduct, domestic effects, or
any discernible domestic connection? In Morrison, Justice Scalia offered one
answer to this question: apply the presumption to the facts of a case when the
activity that comprises the "focus" of the relevant statute occurs outside the
territory of the United States. 88 In the parlance of this justification, when
Congress is legislating about fraudulent securities transactions, it is assumed to
be primarily concerned with domestic fraudulent securities transactions; when
Congress is legislating about employment discrimination, it is primarily
concerned with domestic employment discrimination. 89 Perhaps these are
reasonable assumptions, but would it not also be reasonable to presume that
Congress is worried about American companies engaged in securities fraud or
employment discrimination wherever they are located, or that Congress is
concerned about domestic effects from fraud or discrimination no matter where
it originated? 90 The fact that there are so many different ways to conceptualize
domestic concern - not to mention the fact that different conceptions might
make more sense for different types of legislation - undercuts this assumption
as a sound basis for the presumption against extraterritoriality. And, as
suggested throughout this Part, there is no reason - common sense or otherwise
- to think that territory is the right background rule against which Congress
may legislate.
C. Other Justifications
Early judicial references to the presumption against extraterritoriality
focused on international law and vested rights, while more recent decisions
relied on foreign conflicts and congressional attention. As explained in the
previous Sections, neither the historical nor modem justifications support the
rule. But maybe this judicial window dressing adorns a rule that is truly
justified on other grounds. In particular, perhaps the presumption against
extraterritoriality reflects important structural considerations: the relationship
among the branches of government (the separation of powers) or the
relationship between the state and the people (due process). This Section
addresses each of these justifications, but again concludes that they do not
support the rule as currently constituted.
subjects that are not obviously connected with foreign affairs.
88 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883-85.
89 Id. at 2884 (discussing the securities law at issue in that case and Title VII as at issue
in Aramco, 499 U.S. 244 (1991)).
90 See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 43 (criticizing the focus rule with respect to legislative
intent); Knox, supra, note 44 (same).
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1. Separation of Powers
Although courts do not typically rely on separation of powers to justify the
presumption against extraterritoriality, there is at least a superficial logic to this
view.91 Chief Justice Marshall, in United States v. Palmer, worried about the
judiciary interfering in "delicate" foreign affairs questions, 92 and Professor
Bradley, in defending the presumption, argued that the presumption protects
against "judicial activism. '93 On this theory, the courts are wise to stay out of
foreign affairs, and a presumption against extraterritoriality ostensibly helps
achieve this goal because it requires a clear expression of congressional intent
to reach beyond the borders of the United States.
The separation of powers justification of the presumption fails for a few
reasons, even putting aside charges that the courts should not abdicate their
role in foreign affairs.94 Beginning with the judicial-activism critique, critics
worry that courts might extend extraterritorially those statutes that Congress
intended to be territorial. But, by this logic, courts also would engage in
judicial activism when they constrain territorially those statutes that Congress
intended to be extraterritorial.95 The presumption against extraterritoriality is
supposed to be used only when congressional intent is unclear, so by definition
it is ambiguous whether applying the statute territorially or extraterritorially
would be the "activist" position.96 This theoretical objection is made more
serious in practice. Because the courts have required a fairly strong showing of
congressional intent to overcome the presumption,97 there will be cases where
courts override strong, but less than "clear," evidence of congressional intent.
Professor Brilmayer, in her scathing critique of Morrison, argues that Justice
91 For a discussion of the separation of powers justification, see Dodge, supra note 29, at
120-22. See also Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664-65 (discussing deference to the legislative and
executive branches).
92 United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 633 (1818).
93 Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37
VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 550 (1997).
94 See infra Part II.C (discussing this critique with respect to Chevron deference and
foreign affairs).
95 Professor Dodge makes this point in his critique of Professor Bradley as well. See
Dodge, supra note 29, at 120-22.
96 One could argue that the over-regulating activist is worse than the under-regulating
activist. Indeed, Professor Bradley makes this argument with respect to the Charming Betsy
canon. Bradley, supra note 33, at 532-33. But we need some reason to jump to this
conclusion. An argument based on international law, foreign conflict, or due process may
justify erring on the side of under-regulation, but as explained throughout this Part, the
presumption against extraterritoriality is not a good match for those values. And it is not
clear that over- or underenforcement is always more dangerous.
97 See supra notes 39-40 (discussing the almost-clear-statement approach of recent
decisions).
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Scalia's opinion did just that - "marginalize[d] Congress and then showcase[d]
judicial creativity. '98
The executive's place in the separation of powers also challenges the
presumption.99 It is commonplace to remark on the executive's central role in
foreign affairs; the Supreme Court famously commented in Curtiss-Wright
about "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations."'100
But judges repeatedly have ignored the views of the executive branch in favor
of the presumption against extraterritorially. In Aramco, the Supreme Court
rejected the opinion of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) when it held that Title VII should not be applied extraterritorially,' 0'
and recently the Ninth Circuit relied on Morrison to reject the Department of
Labor's interpretation that a federal worker's compensation statute had an
extraterritorial effect. 10 2 In these decisions, the courts rejected the position of
the executive branch directly. They also may have rejected the position of the
legislative branch indirectly if Congress intended to delegate the interpretive
task to the executive. 10 3 In short, if the presumption is intended to respect the
decisions of the political branches - legislative and executive - it needs work.
2. Due Process
Much like separation of powers, courts do not typically justify the
presumption with reference to due process, but it may be that this individual-
rights interest supports the rule after all. Due process is central to any
discussion of choice of law and, at times, litigants have raised Fifth
Amendment challenges to extraterritorial sUits.1 04
98 Brilmayer, supra note 43, at 656.
99 For further discussion of administrative deference and the presumption, see infra Part
II.C.
100 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
'o' Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 256-58 (1991).
102 Keller Found./Case Found. v. Tracy, 696 F.3d 835, 846 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the
position of the Director of the Department of Labor's Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs regarding the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act).
103 See infra Part II.C (discussing the implied-delegation assumption in administrative
cases).
104 See Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REv.
1019, 1103 n.432 (2011) [hereinafter Colangelo, Unified Approach] (collecting cases in
which a defendant has raised a due process challenge). For further discussion of due
process, see Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth
Amendment Due Process, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1217 (1992); Anthony J. Colangelo,
Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of
National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 121 (2007); A. Mark Weisburd, Due
Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379
(1997).
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The question is what due process means here. In interstate cases, courts have
acknowledged that due process concerns arise when defendants (civil or
criminal) are subject to laws that create "unfair surprise or frustration of
legitimate expectations.' 10 5 The same must be true in extraterritorial cases;
notice is a necessary component of extraterritorial due process.
Tracking an observation made with respect to foreign conflicts above, at a
crude level, any rule that results in the dismissal of some cases has the
potential to protect some defendants to whom notice was not reasonably
available. But also as was observed above, we should expect better alignment
between the due process interests and the presumption if due process is in fact
a basis for the rule. And, like the other bases described in this Part, that
alignment is absent.
First, there are significant classes of cases where extraterritorial defendants
would be the beneficiaries of fair notice. 10 6 Professor Colangelo identifies one
such class of cases - statutes implementing substantive international law. 10 7
Colangelo cites, for example, domestic laws implementing the Montreal
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation.'0 8 A defendant in another signatory state should not be surprised that
the United States also implemented the Montreal Convention's provisions. In
this way, Colangelo reasonably suggests that statutes implementing
international law create "false conflicts" and no due process problem. 109
A similar point arises for cases in which U.S. and foreign laws regulate the
same conduct in the same way. Could a defendant in Canada, a country with
115 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 318 n.24 (1981). Professor Colangelo refers
to this as the "bread and butter of due process" in extraterritorial cases. See Colangelo,
Unified Approach, supra note 104, at 1107. In the interstate context, the notice issue is
connected with issues of state sovereignty, in part due to full faith and credit obligations.
See Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the
Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NoTRE DAME L. REv.
1057, 1113-18 (2009) ("[I]t is... difficult to separate principles of fairness to individuals
from those of appropriate solicitude for the policy decisions of states."); see also Allstate,
449 U.S. at 320-32 (Stevens, J., concurring) (differentiating between obligations arising
from due process versus full faith and credit). This Part, though, seeks to tease out the
individual-rights interest from these other considerations.
106 Whether particular notice should satisfy due process is not relevant to the issue of the
whether the presumption is in sync with due process concerns generally.
107 Colangelo, Unified Approach, supra note 104, at 1103-09 (discussing due process
issues).
108 Id. at 1092-93 (citing Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, codified principally at 18 U.S.C. §
32(b) (2012)); see United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing
the Montreal Convention and due process).
109 Colangelo, Unified Approach, supra note 104, at 1106. See generally Anthony J.
Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International "False Conflict" of Laws, 30 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 881 (2009).
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laws against murder, really argue that she did not know that murder was illegal
under U.S. law? 110 As the Third Circuit wrote: "Inasmuch as the trafficking of
narcotics is condemned universally by law-abiding nations, we see no reason
to conclude that it is 'fundamentally unfair' for Congress to provide for the
punishment of persons apprehended with narcotics on the high seas." '111
Accounting for the laws of other states is not an unchartered path; not only is
this conflicts analysis central to choice-of-law questions of all stripes, it is also
exactly the inquiry that underlies the "dual criminality" requirement that
governs many international extradition agreements. 112 Yet the presumption
does not account for the degree of overlap among domestic laws.
An additional problem with the presumption-as-due-process theory is that
territory is not the only reasonable basis for notice. Nationals of the forum
state, for example, may have notice of their home country's laws when they
travel abroad. And it would be reasonable to expect a defendant intentionally
directing conduct at the United States and causing effects within it to have
understood that she could be subject to the United States' laws. The
international law of prescriptive jurisdiction suggests these and other
predictable bases for notice.1 13 Lastly, the presence of a statute in the United
States Code is not the only way that notice could be given.114 If a federal
agency enforcing a regulatory statute publicizes its extraterritorial effect or
engages in a notorious pattern of extraterritorial enforcement, then
extraterritorial actors operating in the space of the regulation should be on
notice.115
At the same time, the presumption also misses some cases where notice
could be an issue. Here the details of how the presumption is applied are
relevant. Recall Justice Scalia's colorful explanation that no territorial activity
avoids the presumption - "the presumption against extraterritorial application
would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some
domestic activity is involved in the case." ' 16 On this basis, the inverse is also
true - not all extraterritorial activity is sufficient to invoke the presumption.
The Morrison decision says that only the "focus" of the statute matters. So, if a
'l0 Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote: "It is not as if murder were forbidden by U.S.
law but required (or even tolerated) by Mexican law." United States v. Leija-Sanchez, 602
F.3d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 2010).
"' United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993).
112 See Meyer, supra note 4, at 119 (discussing this extradition mainstay as the basis for
an alternative to the presumption against extraterritoriality).
113 See infra Part I.A (discussing the international law of prescriptive jurisdiction).
114 See infra Part II.B (discussing notice in this context).
11 Moreover, sophisticated defendants (for example, multinational corporations
operating in various jurisdictions) are aware of the prospect of extraterritorial regulation.
For example, American firms with large international operations surely are aware of the
expressly extraterritorial Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
116 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).
2014]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
particular set of events has a fleeting connection to the United States, but that
connection happens to fall within the focus of the statute, then the statute
would apply. This rule, not calibrated at all to the "legitimate expectations" of
the defendant, cannot be said to track notice. 117 And by applying such a rule,
the Court has acknowledged the disconnection between the presumption and
due process."! 8
D. Summary
This Part has reviewed a series of justifications for the presumption against
extraterritoriality: international law, vested rights, foreign conflicts, legislative
attention, separation of powers, and due process. One by one, each of these
justifications fell. Either the presumption failed to promote the stated reason, or
the match between the rule and purported purpose was simply too loose to be
credited. The presumption against extraterritoriality is a normative canon.' 19
Because it is unsupported by these normative goals, it should be abandoned.
" Certainly the degree of connection to the United States would be a better proxy for
due process than the focus of the statute. See generally Clopton, supra note 43 (comparing
the American and Canadian approaches to this issue).
I Is A final potential justification not addressed here is predictability. In Morrison, Justice
Scalia expressly justified the presumption, in part, as "preserving a stable background
against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects." Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881.
At best, the argument for predictability justifies a single, clear, and unflinching rule - but it
says nothing about which single, clear, and unflinching rule should be selected, and
therefore it does not justify any particular default rule. So this justification, standing alone,
cannot support the presumption against extraterritoriality with a normative justification -
one this Part finds lacking. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 275-79 (1994) (discussing this justification and rejecting the presumption);
Dodge, supra note 29, at 122-23 (same).Moreover, the actual work of the presumption
undermines the claim that it is in fact a predictable rule. Eskridge, for example, observes
that the Aramco decision likely contradicted the reasonable expectations of a legislator
drafting the statute. ESKRIDGE, JR., supra, at 281-85. Morrison also arguably represented an
unpredictable result, overturning the conventional wisdom of conduct and effects in favor of
Justice Scalia's new "focus" rule. As Justice Stevens wrote:
The Second Circuit refined its test over several decades and dozens of cases, with the
tacit approval of Congress and the [SEC] and with the general assent of its sister
Circuits. That history is a reason we should give additional weight to the Second
Circuit's "judge-made" doctrine, not a reason to denigrate it. "The longstanding
acceptance by the courts, coupled with Congress' failure to reject [its] reasonable
interpretation of the wording of § 10(b), ... argues significantly in favor of acceptance
of the [Second Circuit] rule by this Court."
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2890-91 (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). And, as
scholars have readily pointed out, the application of Morrison's new rule going forward is
hardly predictable. See supra note 43.
119 See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress
Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REv. 561, 563 (1992) ("[Njormative canons are
principles, created in the federal system exclusively by judges, that do not purport to
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Before turning to alternative rules, it is important to consider a different
explanation - what if the problem is not the presumption against
extraterritoriality, but instead the use of presumptions at all? The arguments
put forward in this Part address the normative content of the presumption
against extraterritoriality; they do not suggest that courts applying default rules
cannot do so consistent with international law or separation of powers or due
process, but instead they suggest that this rule does not achieve those
normative goals.
For reasons of efficiency, due process, and separation of powers, clear rules
are valuable. 120 Justice Scalia, for example, remarked that the presumption
against extraterritoriality was important because it "preserv[ed] a stable
background against which Congress can legislate"; 12 1 notice to potential
defendants is frustrated if interpretative rules are not clear;122 and judicial
efficiency is preserved when presumptions are available. 123
But justifications for using canons generally does not mean that any canon
will do. "[S]ubstantive canons are not policy neutral. They represent value
choices by the Court."'1 24 The Court has announced its value choices, but this
Part suggests that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not effectuate
them. In Part II, this Article uses the value choices laid out by courts and
scholars to identify better substantive canons for extraterritorial and related
cases.
II. REPLACEMENTS FOR THE PRESUMPTION
If the presumption against extraterritoriality is not justified, what if any rule
should take its place? Scholars who have criticized the presumption also have
offered rules to replace it. Professor Jeffrey Meyer argued for a "dual illegality
rule," applying U.S. law extraterritorially if the conduct is similarly regulated
in the foreign state. 125 Gary Born called for an international law
presumption. 126 Professor John Knox suggested a presumption against
extrajurisdictionality, relying on the international law of prescriptive
describe accurately what Congress actually intended or what the words of a statute mean,
but rather direct courts to construe any ambiguity in a particular way in order to further
some policy objective.").
120 See supra note 118 (discussing predictability).
121 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881.
122 See supra Part I.C.2.
123 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 737 (1991) ("[C]onclusive presumptions...
[are] designed to avoid the costs of excessive inquiry where a per se rule will achieve the
correct result in almost all cases.").
124 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 595-96 (1992).
125 See Meyer, supra note 4.
126 See Born, supra note 29.
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jurisdiction and congressional signaling. 127 Professor Jonathan Turley
proposed a presumption in favor of extraterritoriality.128
While each of these replacement rules has its merits, the desire for
transsubstantivity 129 obscures the better approach. As this Part shows, the
differences among classes of statutes - here divided into civil, criminal, and
administrative - are significant, indeed more significant, than the differences
between territorial and extraterritorial cases. 30 As a result, the rules governing
extraterritorial cases should reflect not just those values drawn from
transnational relations generally, but also the particular characteristics of civil,
criminal, and administrative law and the existing rules in each of those spheres.
At least on its face, the presumption against extraterritoriality - and the
transsubstantive alternatives mentioned above - apply to statutes in all three
classes. The forthcoming sections explain why civil, criminal, and
administrative statutes deserve separate treatment, and each section offers an
alternative approach to extraterritoriality drawn from existing jurisprudence in
that area. 131
A. Civil Cases
The natural place to begin is civil litigation. Although courts have invoked
the presumption in criminal cases too,132 the Supreme Court has primarily
addressed this rule in civil statutes and the scholarship just mentioned almost
127 See Knox, supra note 29.
128 See Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 598 (1990).
129 See Robert M. Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the
Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975) (discussing "trans-substantive" procedural rules).
130 This is not to say that no topic is amenable to transsubstantive rules. Procedural rules
typically do not vary in civil and administrative cases, and there are some core procedural
practices that apply in criminal and civil courtrooms. With respect to statutory
interpretation, some background rules are just as applicable to criminal and civil statutes -
the commonsense advice that "a word is known by the company it keeps" and that "words
grouped in a list should be given related meaning" should guide courts in civil and criminal
matters. See S.D. Warren v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006) (quoting
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995); Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36
(1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)). And as explained below, there are some
constitutional canons that trump Chevron deference, and thus guide courts interpreting
statutes in administrative law cases just as they would civil and criminal ones. See infra Part
II.C.
131 Professor Anthony Colangelo's "unified approach" also rejects transsubstantivity, but
it divides statutes into international law enforcing and noninternational law enforcing, see
Colangelo, Unified Approach, supra note 104, rather than applying the civil-criminal-
administrative distinction discussed here.
132 See infra Part II.B (providing a discussion of the criminal jurisprudence). See
generally Clopton, supra note 29.
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exclusively focused on the civil side.133 The reasons for this Article's civil-
criminal-administrative division is more fully explored in the following
sections, but in order to highlight differences we need to start with one of the
three categories.
Part I explained all of the reasons that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is not a good fit for civil statutes. Those reasons also point to
the first of our alternative rules. Part I began with international law, and it is to
international law that we turn here. Rather than relying on "territoriality" to
define the acceptable reach of a statute, courts should look to the content of
international law. And, in other cases, the Supreme Court has instructed courts
to do just that.
Named for an 1804 Supreme Court decision, 134 the Charming Betsy canon
tells courts to adopt reasonable constructions of ambiguous statutes consistent
with the requirements of international law.135 International law is not always
self-executing, 136 but this canon incorporates it into statutory interpretation. As
Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in the Charming Betsy case, "an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains."' 137 U.S. courts have applied the Charming
Betsy canon for two centuries, 138 and the Supreme Court has called this canon
"beyond debate."' 139
131 See supra notes 125, 126, 129, 128 & 131 and accompanying text.
134 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). Amusingly,
the Charming Betsy case was not the first U.S. Supreme Court decision to announce what
has become known as the Charming Betsy canon; the same principle was announced three
years earlier in Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 43 (1801) ("[T]he laws of the United
States ought not, if it be avoidable, so to be construed as to infract the common principles
and usages of nations, or the general doctrines of national law."). For further discussion of
the Charming Betsy canon, see Bradley, supra note 33; Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of
International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1103
(1990); Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 185 (1993); Note, The Charming Betsy Canon, Separation of Powers, and
Customary International Law, 121 HARV. L. REv. 1215 (2008).
135 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 21-
22 (1963).
136 Although the Supreme Court famously characterized international law as "part of our
law" in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), not all international law is directly
enforceable in U.S. courts. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 111(3) (1986) ("Courts in the United States are bound to give effect
to international law and to international agreements of the United States, except that a 'non-
self-executing' agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary
implementation."). See generally Michael A. McKenzie, Treaty Enforcement in U.S. Courts,
34 HARv. INT'L L.J. 596 (1993).
"I Charming Betsy, 6U.S. at 118.
138 For an excellent history of the canon and its use, see Bradley, supra note 33, at 485-
95. In addition, there appears to be an equivalent international law canon in many other
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Importantly for present purposes, the international law incorporated through
the Charming Betsy canon includes substantive international law rules and the
international law of prescriptive jurisdiction. 40 Prescriptive jurisdiction is the
power of the state "to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or
status of persons, or the interests of persons in things.' 14' In this way, the
international law of prescriptive jurisdiction (through the Charming Betsy
canon) offers a separate framework to deal with the ambiguities alternatively
addressed by the presumption against extraterritoriality. The Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law helpfully lists the permissible "bases" of prescriptive
jurisdiction under international law: (1) territoriality; (2) nationality;
(3) objective territoriality, meaning that the conduct had effects within the
state's territory; (4) passive personality, meaning that the conduct is directed
against the state or its vital interests; and (5) universal jurisdiction. 42 This list
of bases shows that the international law of prescriptive jurisdiction sweeps
broader than a territorial principle, authorizing the application of domestic laws
to extraterritorial nationals and to extraterritorial conduct with particular
nonterritorial connections to the forum state. By applying the Charming Betsy
jurisdictions, including Canada, Australia, and England. Polites v Commonwealth (1945) 70
CLR 60, 68 (Austl.) ("[T]here is a general rule of construction of statutes according to
which, unless the contrary intention is clear, it is to be presumed that they do not violate any
recognized rule of international law."); Daniels v. White & The Queen, [1968] S.C.R. 517,
541 (Can.) (Pigeon, J.) ("Parliament is not presumed to legislate in breach of a treaty or in
any manner inconsistent with the comity of nations and the established rules of international
law."); Triquet v. Bath, (1764) 97 Eng. Rep. 936, 938; 3 Burr. 1478 ("[T]he law of nations,
in its full extent was part of the law of England.").
139 DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988). But see Turley, supra note 134, at 262-70 (calling for "decanonization").
140 For example, the Supreme Court invoked the canon in connection with prescriptive
jurisdiction in Hartford Fire Insurance v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), and McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21-22, while it was substantive international law at
issue in Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (construing a statute in keeping with a
substantive executive agreement), and in the original Charming Betsy case, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64 (1804) (discussing the law of nations with respect to neutrals' rights). See
Steinhardt, supra note 134, at 1152-62 (cataloging the use of substantive international law in
Charming Betsy cases). But see Turley, supra note 134, at 215-17 (rejecting this use of
Charming Betsy).
141 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401
(1986). This section of the Restatement contrasts prescriptive jurisdiction with adjudicatory
and enforcement jurisdiction. Id. The Restatement also includes a version of the Charming
Betsy doctrine. See id. § 114 ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be
construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of
the United States."). For more definitive treatments of the international law of prescriptive
jurisdiction than this Article, see MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 572-622 (5th ed.
2003); Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587 (1978).
142 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
(1986).
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canon to prescriptive jurisdiction, courts can interpret geoambiguous statutes to
apply only as far as international law permits.
With respect to those values discussed in Part I, an approach based on
prescriptive jurisdiction fares much better than the presumption against
extraterritoriality. The international law justification is straightforward. As
explained above, international law fits poorly with the presumption against
extraterritoriality, 143  but Charming Betsy self-evidently conforms to
international law norms - it looks to extant international law to answer the
statutory-reach question) 44 This international law approach also avoids
conflicts with foreign law; as Rosalyn Higgins wrote, "[t]here is no more
important way to avoid conflict than by providing clear norms as to which state
can exercise authority over whom, and in what circumstances. ' 145 Not only
does the Charming Betsy canon incorporate such clear norms, it derives those
norms from international law, which reflects the will of the community of
states. 146 Further, this international law approach may reduce conflicts by
eliminating some "under-regulated zones" within the exclusive control of the
United States but outside its territory. 47
Separation of powers also supports the Charming Betsy approach to
prescriptive jurisdiction.148 To begin with, it is important to observe that the
Charming Betsy canon looks to international law only when a statute is
ambiguous, meaning that the legislature is free to violate international law if it
chooses.149 From a separation of powers perspective, this allowance is a natural
43 See supra Part I.A.
14' See Bradley, supra note 33, at 497-504 (discussing the related "internationalist
conception" of Charming Betsy).
145 ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE
IT 56 (1994).
146 Treaty law obviously requires state consent, and customary international law only
takes on its legal status if it is imbued with opinio juris: the understanding that actions are
required by a legal obligation. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
opiniojuris as "[t]he principle that for conduct or a practice to become a rule of customary
international law, it must be shown that nations believe that international law (rather than
moral obligation) mandates the conduct or practice"); see also Statute of the International
Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1060 (identifying as a source of
law "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law"); North Sea
Continental Shelf, Judgment (Ger./Neth. & Ger./Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, para. 77 (Febr. 20)
("Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such,
or be carried out in such a way. as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.").
147 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
148 Indeed, Professor Bradley suggests that the canon is best understood as reflecting the
separation of powers. Bradley, supra note 33, at 524-31.
149 E.g., Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Though it clearly has constitutional authority to do so, Congress is generally presumed not
to have exceeded those customary international-law limits on jurisdiction to prescribe.").
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outgrowth of the legislature's responsibility to make law and the courts'
deference to the political branches with respect to international affairs. 50
When the statute is truly ambiguous, courts are in a different position - they
are without guidance from the legislature on the international law question.
And in these circumstances, the separation of powers counsels modesty. Courts
should avoid accidental breaches of international law; in other words, if the
United States is going to adopt a law that extends beyond its internationally
recognized prescriptive jurisdiction, then the law should pass through the
normal lawmaking process that involves Congress and the President.'
5
'
Professor Bradley also suggests a second-order separation of powers
justification for this canon - by defaulting against violations of international
law, the Charming Betsy canon reduces the frequency with which Congress
unintentionally (via the courts) interferes with the executive's conduct of
diplomacy. 152 Not only does the canon protect Congress's lawmaking
prerogatives, it also allows the executive to remain the "one voice" in foreign
affairs until Congress explicitly reshapes the law. 53
This case for a prescriptive-jurisdictional approach to statutory ambiguity
has focused on international law's list of permissible bases, but admittedly
international law includes an additional requirement. According to the
Restatement, "[e]ven when one of the bases for jurisdiction... is present, a
state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or
150 See Steinhardt, supra note 134, at 1165-73.
151 See Bradley, supra note 33, at 524-29 (discussing these and other separation of
powers arguments in favor of Charming Betsy); Knox, supra note 29, at 386-88 (discussing
the idea that courts should avoid accidental breaches of international law). Analogously,
bicameralism and presentment are understood as bulwarks of federalism (protecting the
states from the federal government), even though they regulate the intrafederal separation of
powers. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of
Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001). Although it is true that courts take a position on a
foreign affairs issue when they interpret a statute in keeping with international law, this
approach places limits on courts' authority (interpreting an ambiguous and amendable
domestic statute) and mission (interpreting the contents, rather than the policy merit, of
international law). See Bradley, supra note 33, at 531-32 (offering a similar response to the
claim that the Charming Betsy canon does not remove the courts from the foreign affairs
debates).
152 See Bradley, supra note 33, at 526 ("[B]y requiring Congress to decide expressly
whether and how to violate international law, the canon reduces the number of occasions in
which Congress unintentionally interferes with the diplomatic prerogatives of the
President.").
153 One justification not discussed so far is legislative intent. There are arguments on
both sides of the question whether Congress has a preference against violating international
law. Compare id at 495-97 (collecting sources making this argument), with id at 517-19
(rejecting the argument). Yet even Bradley, who originally dismisses this argument,
ultimately concludes that "[i]t seems likely that, at least in a weak sense, the political
branches.., still care about international law." Id. at 533.
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activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable."' 154 This reasonableness limit necessarily adds
uncertainty to the international law inquiry, which in theory is undesirable,
155
but there are reasons to countenance reasonableness here. First, many of the
justifications for a Charming Betsy rule are based on its incorporation of
international law, and like the eggshell plaintiff,156 one must take international
law as one finds it. If international law today includes a reasonableness limit,
so be it. Second, there is a normative case for this rule as well - assuming the
courts can divide exercises of jurisdiction between reasonable and
unreasonable, then it would be preferable to decline jurisdiction where
unreasonable (and where Congress has not indicated otherwise). 157
"Reasonableness" is also an improvement over "international comity," which
seems to lack any moorings in law or policy. 158
So far this Section has addressed the international law of prescriptive
jurisdiction, but the Charming Betsy canon also looks to substantive
154 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(1986).
155 Justice Scalia prizes predictability with respect to the presumption against
extraterritoriality. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010)
("Rather than guess anew in each case, we apply the presumption in all cases, preserving a
stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects."). Yet he
also is a staunch defender of the reasonableness analysis with respect to prescriptive
jurisdiction and the Charming Betsy canon. Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,
818-21 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating for section 403 of the Restatement and its
reasonableness inquiry).
156 E.g., Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669, 679 ("If a man is negligently run
over or otherwise negligently injured in his body, it is no answer to the sufferer's claim for
damages that he would have suffered less injury, or no injury at all, if he had not had an
unusually thin skull or an unusually weak heart."); Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404
(Wis. 1891).
157 Courts should be encouraged to take a modest role with respect to this inquiry, relying
on the political branches where possible. In addition, the substantive international law
discussed shortly provides one potential source for the reasonableness inquiry, and
Charming Betsy incorporates it as well.
158 See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress 1lI, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International
Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 11, 33 (2010) ("At bottom, the comity
doctrine is a mess because courts do not know when it applies. Even when it does apply,
courts have not been given concrete direction how to apply it, especially when faced with
governmental submissions and conflicting governmental submissions."); Michael D.
Ramsey, Escaping "International Comity," 83 IOWA L. REV. 893, 893 (1998)
("[International comity] is an expression of unexplained authority, imprecise meaning and
uncertain application. Its use confuses inquiries that ought to be clear and distinct, and
submerges issues that should be carefully and forthrightly considered. Its invocation has
produced a series of international cases explicable only by reference to ill-defined judicial
intuitions.").
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international law. 159 Substantive international law issues could arise with
respect to geoambiguous statutes. For example, Justice Blackmun in Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, Inc. worried that a principle of geographic reach (the
presumption against extraterritoriality) was prioritized over international
refugee law. 160 In such cases, the Charming Betsy canon requires the
interpretation of the ambiguous statute to conform to substantive international
law principles as well, including international law rules derived from non-self-
executing treaties and customary law rules that are not enforceable directly in
U.S. courts.
16 1
For many of the reasons just articulated, this approach to substantive
international law dovetails with the justifications discussed in Part I. The
connection to international law is once again self-evident. And some foreign
conflicts could be avoided, because this approach reduces violations of
international law that would be natural sources of such conflicts. Here again,
this approach is admittedly a normative canon - that is, it relies (at least in
part) on policy preferences 62 - but the preference in favor of compliance with
international law is long standing, well tailored to courts, and reasonable. 163
Structurally, the separation of powers arguments mentioned above also support
the substantive law version of Charming Betsy: Congress can break substantive
international law with unambiguous text, but courts should wait for Congress
to make those choices rather than guessing about legislative intent. 164
Therefore, an all-inclusive Charming Betsy rule in civil cases makes a good
substitute for the unjustified presumption against extraterritoriality.
For the reasons explained here, rather than applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality in civil cases, the important formal, functional, and
normative interests are better served by the Charming Betsy canon: unless a
" See supra note 140.
160 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. One also could imagine executive
agreements regulating U.S. government conduct overseas coming into contact with
geoambiguous statutes, see Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982) (discussing one such
executive agreement), or treaties with "national treatment" provisions requiring the
application of geoambiguous statutes beyond where the traditional prescriptive-jurisdiction
analysis might lead.
161 See supra notes 136 & 140. Perhaps these substantive commitments also will aid the
courts in assessing reasonableness under Restatement section 403. For further discussion of
the Charming Betsy canon and non-self-executing treaties, see Rebecca Crootof, Note,
Judicious Influence: Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Charming Betsy Canon, 120
YALE L.J. 1784 (2011).
162 See supra note 119.
163 See supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text (discussing reasons to support a
Charming Betsy view); see also Bradley, supra note 33, at 532-33 (justifying this canon);
Steinhardt, supra note 134 (making the normative case).
164 See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text. Also as described above, this
approach will avoid unintentional interference with executive foreign policy and diplomacy.
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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contrary intent appears, U.S. civil statutes shall be construed consistent with
(substantive and jurisdictional) international law.
B. Criminal Cases
The denaturing of a transsubstantive approach begins when we turn to
criminal statutes. As mentioned above, U.S. courts apply the presumption
against extraterritoriality to civil and criminal statutes. 165 Courts deciding
extraterritorial criminal cases routinely cite civil decisions articulating the
presumption, and these courts repeatedly assert that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is the right interpretative principle for extraterritorial criminal
prosecutions. 166 But just because courts have applied the same presumption in
civil and criminal cases does not mean that is the best approach. 167 As this
Section marches through the differences between civil and criminal
extraterritorial cases, the justification for a different rule for extraterritorial
criminal cases will become apparent.
The most salient difference between criminal and civil cases is the liberty
interest at stake. Criminal cases implicate liberty interests of defendants in a
way that civil cases simply do not. 168 There is an "instinctive distaste against
men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they
should."'169 Criminal law reflects this distaste in manifold ways. For example,
U.S. courts employ all sorts of procedural protections in criminal cases; 70 they
165 See Clopton, supra note 29, at 165-72. The Supreme Court most prominently
addressed extraterritoriality in criminal law in United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
166 See Clopton, supra note 29, at 165-72 (collecting cases). Courts in Canada and
Australia also apply the presumption against extraterritoriality in criminal cases. See
Clopton, supra note 43, at 227-35.
167 As it turns out, courts do not in fact treat civil and criminal cases identically. As
explored in greater detail in a prior article, lower courts in criminal cases suggest that civil
precedents apply, but these criminal decisions are much more likely to find ways to permit
the extraterritorial prosecution to go forward. See Clopton, supra note 29, at 165-72. The
details of how the courts achieve these outcomes are not relevant here. The important points
are that, in theory, the same presumption applies in civil and criminal cases and, in practice,
courts are more likely to permit a criminal case through the presumption's filter than one
would expect based on the law as described.
168 This is not to say that a massive money judgment or a civil injunction would not
impinge a defendant's liberty, but that such an impingement is in a different class than
incarceration (or capital punishment).
169 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, reprinted in HENRY J. FRIENDLY,
BENCHMARKS 196,209 (1967)).
70 As Professor Carol Steiker explained, significant procedural differences exist between
criminal and civil cases:
Deeply embedded in Anglo-American law, and in many other legal systems, is a sharp
procedural divide between criminal and civil cases. In criminal cases, the U.S.
Constitution requires a long list of costly, thumb-on-the-scale procedural protections
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apply a void-for-vagueness doctrine to criminal laws; 171 and the right to
counsel is more robust in criminal law. 172 With respect to statutory
construction, courts have adopted a rule of lenity for criminal cases absent
from civil analogs. 73 The rule of lenity tells courts to resolve ambiguities in
that are not required, and thus very rarely employed, in civil cases. This list includes
not merely the protection against double jeopardy and the prohibition of ex post facto
laws.., but also the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the free provision of
legal counsel, the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence, the privilege against
self-incrimination, and numerous other requirements.
Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 777-78 (1997) (footnotes omitted). But see JAMES Q.
WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL
TRIAL 4 (2008) (explaining that the reasonable doubt standard was introduced in English
criminal law to encourage more convictions).
171 See generally Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279 (2003). The vagueness rule implicates the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 280 n. 1. The Supreme
Court first articulated a void-for-vagueness doctrine in United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1875). Originally, the void-for-vagueness doctrine was justified on the basis of notice and
separation of powers, although more recently the courts have justified the doctrine as
preventing arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement (by executive and judicial actors).
See Goldsmith, supra, at 283-94; see also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 149-53
(1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (articulating this new justification in the Supreme Court for
the first time). See generally Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (articulating the
current rationales for the doctrine). These doctrinal justifications track the logic of the lenity
requirement discussed in detail later in this Section.Admittedly, the void-for-vagueness
doctrine may be applicable to some civil statutes imposing civil penalties. See, e.g., FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012) (holding that the FCC standards as
applied were impermissibly vague); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-51
(1991) (invalidating the statute as vague). But this doctrine is most prominent, and indeed
most strictly enforced, in criminal cases. See Goldsmith, supra, at 281 ("The [Supreme]
Court has also expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal
penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe." (citing
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982))).
172 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI (including a right to counsel in criminal cases), with
U.S. CONST. amend. VII (including no such right in civil cases).
173 The rule of lenity may be applied in civil cases, though, if they call for the
construction of a criminal statute. E.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8 (2004) (construing
a criminal DUI statute in the context of an immigration proceeding); FCC v. ABC, 347 U.S.
284, 296 (1954) ("It is true ... that these are not criminal cases, but it is a criminal statute
that we must interpret."). For further discussion of lenity, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991);
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71
VA. L. REV. 189 (1985); Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994
SuP. CT. REV. 345; Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 57 (1998). For perhaps its earliest invocation by the U.S. Supreme Court, see United
States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820), and for perhaps its most famous, see
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criminal statutes in favor of defendants. The gravity of a criminal prosecution
and its potential liberty-depriving consequences, therefore, point to clear-
statement requirements for criminal law. And with respect to the cases
addressed in this Article, such an approach would manifest itself in a lenity
approach to extraterritoriality: Congress should have to say explicitly if
criminal laws are to be applied extraterritorially.
174
Separation of powers concerns also reveal a criminal-civil distinction that
supports the rule of lenity in extraterritorial criminal cases. The rule of lenity
has been justified historically based on legislative supremacy - the notion that,
in criminal cases more than civil ones, the legislature should make the relevant
policy choices to which the loss of liberty attaches. 17 5 More recently, the rule
of lenity has been linked to nondelegation; Congress cannot delegate criminal
lawmaking to courts, and so courts must strictly construe criminal statutes to
avoid impermissibly making law of their own.176 These arguments hold in
extraterritorial cases. Indeed, they may be stronger in the area of international
relations, where separation of powers concerns are salient and where issues of
international sovereignty may be implicated when legislation reaches beyond
the state's borders. So even if one were dubious of the separation of powers
account of lenity in the normal course, it is given added weight when
addressing criminal cases with potential international relations consequences;
and even if one were dubious about legislative supremacy in foreign affairs, it
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26 (1931).
174 Going one step further than a pure liberty-based account, Professor Eskridge suggests
that the rule of lenity responds to bias in the political process against criminal defendants
and in favor of disproportionality in criminal penalties. ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 118, at
295 ("[C]riminal defendants are poorly represented in the political process, while state and
federal prosecutors (the losers in rule of lenity cases) are unusually well represented."). This
logic applies here as well.
'"5 The Supreme Court justifies the rule of lenity by legislative supremacy (separation of
powers) and notice (due process):
First, "a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world
will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the
warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear." Second, because of the
seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents
the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define
criminal activity.
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (citation omitted); see also Eskridge, Jr. &
Frickey, supra note 124, at 600 (suggesting that lenity also functions as a constitutional
avoidance doctrine); Kahan, supra note 173, at 419 (identifying, and ultimately rejecting, a
nondelegation conception of the rule of lenity); Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule
of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 885, 887 (2004) (justifying the rule of lenity based on
accountability and disclosure).
176 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 173, at 350. This understanding also places a limit on
Congress: Congress cannot delegate criminal law policy choices even if it would prefer to
do so. Id. For a different approach in administrative civil cases, see infra Part II.C.
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is given added weight when addressing criminal cases with significant liberty
interests at stake.
Separation of powers constraints on the executive support extraterritorial
lenity in criminal cases as well. In criminal law, the executive is a litigant, and
one with extreme power. The judicial and legislative branches must check the
executive's authority as law enforcer. 177 A separation of powers approach to
criminal extraterritoriality, therefore, is one in which democratically elected
legislatures must decide the scope of criminal laws, but also an approach in
which Congress and the courts hem in the executive's criminal enforcement.
Territoriality draws a narrow but workable line, and the executive must involve
Congress should it want to reach beyond that limit.
Due process also justifies a different approach in criminal cases. Notice is
the other historical justification for the rule of lenity, 178 and again the liberty
interests in criminal cases make this due process concern more acute. Part I
questioned the idea that potential malefactors scour the United States Code
before acting.' 79 But this fiction is central to centuries of criminal law, and one
177 See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988) (discussing that the
rule of lenity protects against "selective or arbitrary enforcement"); see also supra note 171
(highlighting how the void-for-vagueness doctrine seeks to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory law enforcement). As Justice Robert Jackson stated, "[t]he prosecutor has
more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America." Robert H.
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JuDICATURE Soc'Y 18, 18 (1940). Prosecutorial
discretion has the capacity to be dangerous. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional
Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 869 (2009); Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the
Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393 (2001); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1523-37 (1981). Recognizing these dangers,
the executive often tries to limit its use. For example, rather than deferring to individual
prosecutors, it is the express policy of the United States Justice Department to charge "the
most serious offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant's conduct, and that is
likely to result in a sustainable conviction." Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S.
Attorney Gen., to All Fed. Prosecutors 2 (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.justice.
gov/oip/holder-memo-charging-sentencing.pdf (quoting U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S.
Attorney's Manual § 9-27.300 (2d ed. 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa
/foiareadingroom/usam/index.html).
178 As Justice Holmes wrote, "a fair warning should be given to the world in language
that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is
passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear." McBoyle, 283
U.S. at 27; see supra Part I.C.2 (discussing due process).
171 McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 27 ("Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully
consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning
should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what
the law intends to do if a certain line is passed."); see also, e.g., Kahan, supra note 173, at
363-67 ("Taken literally, the 'fair notice' argument is implausible because the broad
reading.., would not have affected anyone who was honestly attempting to conform her
behavior to what she believed the criminal law required.").
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that should not be cast away like so much flotsam when incarceration (or
worse) is at stake.'80
Two aspects of extraterritoriality provide reasons to think that the notice
justification for lenity is particularly appealing in this context. First, critics of
lenity-as-due-process disparage the rule because, in many circumstances, there
would be no doubt that the conduct was prohibited (or at least socially
undesirable). Are we really concerned that a defendant did not know that
murder was wrong? As Professor Kahan puts it, the due process argument for
the rule of lenity is strongest "when a court is applying a statute to conduct that
sits on the boundary line between socially desirable and socially undesirable
conduct .... [b]ut the situation is quite different when the underlying conduct
is located not on the border but deep within the interior of what is socially
undesirable.' 181 This is a significant concern for using notice to justify a
comprehensive rule of lenity, but extraterritoriality is narrower. Here, Kahan's
boundaries metaphor applies to actual boundaries - when conduct is deep
within the interior of the forum state, there is little doubt its laws apply, but as
that conduct moves out to the boundary line, the situation is quite different. 182
This concern also explains why the tighter strictures of territoriality rather than
the looser rules of prescriptive jurisdictionality might be appropriate in
criminal cases. Although territoriality might be too narrow a limit to serve as a
default rule for all cases, its long history and straightforward application make
it an intuitive and bright-line basis for notice in criminal cases. 183
The second reason to consider extraterritorial lenity is the role of
extradition. In multinational criminal cases, there are at least two relevant sets
of laws, the substance of which might give us some indication about the notice
available. Imagine two statutes. One criminalizes conduct that is illegal
literally everywhere else; for sake of argument, say murder. The other is a
180 United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 309 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
181 Kahan, supra note 173, at 400.
182 Kahan makes the same borders argument with respect to overdeterrence. Id. at 402. 1
would offer the same rejoinder as applied to extraterritoriality.
183 Critics of the rule of lenity have argued that the rule is impossible to manage because
one can find ambiguity in every statute. The famed Hart-Fuller debate about "vehicles in the
park," compare H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv.
L. REV. 593, 607 (1958), and H.L.A. Hart, Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1281-82
(1965) (reviewing LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964)), with Lon L. Fuller,
Positivism and Fidelity to Law - a Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 661-69
(1958), and the torrent of scholarship in its wake, see, e.g., Frederick Schauer, A Critical
Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1109, 1111 n.10 (2008) (collecting
sources), raise this metalinguistic critique of so-called statutory ambiguity. If every statute
could be said to be ambiguous, then lenity could swallow the entire corpus of criminal law.
This concern is mitigated by the scope of the question - extraterritoriality is a single issue,
and while an unbounded rule of lenity might be unruly, a bounded one is predictable in its
application and results.
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singularly American creation. Putting aside constitutional problems, assume
that this statute criminalizes the burning of the American flag. Now imagine
two defendants charged in U.S. courts, one for murder and one for flag
burning, and in both cases the relevant conduct occurred outside the United
States. If neither statute specified extraterritorial application and the courts
applied the rule-of-lenity approach proposed here, U.S. courts would not be
able to sanction either defendant. But extradition presents a potential backstop.
Extradition treaties typically include a principle of dual criminality, permitting
extradition only if the conduct is illegal in both states.184 Turning back to the
hypothetical defendants, the flag-burning defendant would go free, but the
alleged murderer could be extradited to the conduct state. 185 Thus, the rule of
lenity acts as a forum-selection mechanism for conduct illegal in both states -
for which notice to the defendant is less of a concern. Meanwhile, the same
rule acts as a shield for defendants for uniquely American offenses committed
abroad - for which it is less plausible to assume the defendant had notice. 186
184 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 476(1)(c) (1986) (explaining that most extradition agreements and laws only permit
extradition "if the offense with which he is charged or of which he has been convicted is not
punishable as a serious crime in both the requesting and the requested state"); John G.
Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1459 (1988) ("A
maxim of international law, and a standard provision in nearly every United States
extradition treaty, is that extradition will not take place unless the offense charged is a crime
in both the demanding and the requested country. This is called the rule of 'double
criminality."' (footnote omitted)); Meyer, supra note 4, at 167-69 (discussing the "dual
criminality" rule (citing William V. Dunlap, Dual Criminality in Penal Transfer Treaties,
29 VA. J. INT'L L. 813, 829 (1989))).
185 It is also the case that courts will not enforce the criminal laws of a foreign
jurisdiction, meaning that, in the reverse scenario, the United States would neither prosecute
nor extradite defendants under a unique foreign law. See generally William S. Dodge,
Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 161 (2002).
186 This also explains what should be made of criminal cases arising outside of the
territory of the United States but within its prescriptive jurisdiction grounded in some other
basis. That said, this approach also raises the possibility of malefactors leaving the United
States in order to commit these offenses. There are at least two potential responses to this
concern. The first is to blame the lawmakers. The purpose of the rule of lenity, and indeed
the purpose of many criminal procedural protections, is not to maximize convictions.
Sometimes bad acts are not subject to criminal penalties. The rule of lenity acts to force
Congress to make policy choices, and Congress can always expressly apply criminal statutes
extraterritorially. More specifically, Congress could assign criminal liability where the
defendant left the United States "with the intent to evade detection" or prosecution. See
supra note 37 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2285(a) (2012)). Second, there may be ways to account
for jurisdictional escape with current law. For example, perhaps the criminal conspiracy
statutes would be sufficient. Or, perhaps this risk would justify defining "territoriality" to
include conduct outside the United States that intentionally targets persons or property
within it - a definition that could be adopted by the courts or Congress. See Clopton, supra
note 43, at 42-44 (discussing the possibility of a legislative definition of territoriality).
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As hinted at throughout this Section, the foreign relations justifications of
international comity and concern with foreign conflicts also support a lenity
approach to criminal extraterritoriality. Scholars have acknowledged that the
"due process" interests protected by choice-of-law and personal-jurisdiction
rules are dual purposed - they not only directly protect the individual
defendant, but also manifest sovereignty considerations in transborder cases.
Extraterritorial regulation threatens both the liberty of individual regulatees
and the sovereignty of foreign states.187 Lenity, therefore, also may avoid
conflicts and promote international comity by avoiding unintended extensions
of U.S. law. And again, because of the associated criminal penalties, the stakes
for potential conflicts may be high. In the words of the Restatement: "[T]he
exercise of criminal (as distinguished from civil) jurisdiction in relation to acts
committed in another state may be perceived as particularly intrusive.
188
To conclude, rather than a transsubstantive presumption, a lenity-based rule
in criminal cases protects defendants, sovereign states, and the separation of
powers; unless a clear statement of legislative intent provides otherwise, U.S.
criminal statutes shall apply only within the territorial limits of the United
States.
C. Administrative Cases
With criminal and civil statutes out of the way, it may seem like this Part
has covered the waterfront of potentially extraterritorial statutes. But, in light
of the justifications of the presumption, not all civil statutes are created equal.
In particular, the values that Part I outlines suggest a different approach in
administrative cases. Notably, there is no consensus in the courts (or the
scholarly community) about the relationship between administrative deference
doctrines like Chevron and interpretative canons like the presumption against
extraterritoriality.' 89 As is explored more fully throughout this Section, these
187 E.g., Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the
Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1057, 1113-18 (2009) ("[A] state that ignores due process guarantees through the heedless
application of forum law is generally violating the rights not only of the defendants in
question but of another state."); Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L.
REv. 1587, 1594-95 (1978) ("In the relatively rare case where a detailed analysis is required
to resolve the question of a state's legislative jurisdiction, the factors to be considered fall
into two categories, each corresponding to one of the two aspects of the basic test for
legislative jurisdiction under due process: factors concerned with fairness to the parties and
those involving other interstate or international system values." (footnote omitted)).
188 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
Reporters' Notes n.8 (1986). The note goes on to say that "[i]t is generally accepted by
enforcement agencies of the United States government that criminal jurisdiction over
activity with substantial foreign elements should be exercised more sparingly than civil
jurisdiction over the same activity." Id.
189 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text; see also Eric A. Posner & Cass R.
Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1202-04 (2006).
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cases merit separate treatment from private civil actions because in these cases
Congress has delegated the authority to interpret the relevant statute to the
executive and an executive agency has staked out an ex ante interpretation of
the geoambiguous statute's reach. 190 This Section first considers why
administrative extraterritorial cases merit different treatment (that is, some
level of deference), and then it turns to the details of how Chevron deference in
particular would fit in this context. 19'
Foreign-affairs deference has been a popular topic among legal scholars. A
brief survey of some of that recent conversation is as follows. In a 2000 article,
Professor Curtis Bradley argued for administrative deference in foreign-affairs
law, 192 specifically arguing that Chevron deference should trump foreign-
affairs canons like the presumption against extraterritoriality and the Charming
Betsy doctrine on the basis of expertise, 193 accountability, 194 uniformity, 195
flexibility, 196 and the separation of powers. 197 He also observed that Chevron is
190 The term "agency" is used to encompass whatever executive actor issues the formal
interpretation discussed here, and the term "administrative" is used to encompass the class
of cases and statutes just described.
191 This Section does not propose deference in criminal law. The same reasons that
justify treating criminal cases differently from civil cases support the decision to decline
executive deference in criminal cases, not to mention the particular role occupied by the
executive in criminal prosecutions. Typically, the courts do not give deference to the
executive with respect to criminal law. See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152,
177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Justice Department, of course, has a very specific
responsibility to determine for itself what this statute means, in order to decide when to
prosecute; but we have never thought that the interpretation of those charged with
prosecuting criminal statutes is entitled to deference."); Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant
to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REv 469, 490-91 (1996) (describing, and
disagreeing with, the court's refusal to apply Chevron deference to the Justice Department's
interpretation of criminal statutes). And, as discussed briefly below, the rule of lenity is a
constitutionally inspired canon that may trump Chevron deference anyway. See infra note
236 (discussing Sunstein and constitutionally inspired canons). For a collection of cases
addressing lenity and Chevron, see Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron
Deference, 58 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 38-47 (2006).
192 See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L.
REv. 649 (2000).
193 Id at 673-75. The expertise case, and its connection to Chevron, is discussed below.
See infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
194 Bradley, supra note 192, at 673-75. Accountability, as well, is covered later in this
Section. See infra notes 214 and accompanying text.
195 The argument for uniformity is that the "one voice" of the executive branch is
preferable to the cacophony of the federal courts. Bradley, supra note 192, at 673-75. This is
particularly salient given that the Supreme Court - presumably the "one voice" of the
judiciary - has not spoken to the relationship between Chevron and the foreign affairs
canons. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 189, at 1202-04.
196 Bradley, supra note 192, at 673-75. Bradley argues that the executive branch is more
flexible than the courts when it comes to changing its position, and he rightly notes that
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entrenched in the law, 198 and that because foreign-affairs law is traditionally
suffused with executive deference, it is perhaps the best case scenario for
administrative deference. 199 Professors Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein went
further, calling for an entire regime of foreign-affairs deference. 200 Professors
Derek Jinks and Neal Katyal challenged Posner and Sunstein in the same issue
of the Yale Law Journal.201 Jinks and Katyal were concerned that Posner and
Sunstein's proposal concentrated too much authority in the executive,202
overstated the case for executive expertise,203 ignored the dynamic process of
statutory interpretation (involving the courts and Congress in dialogue), 20 4 and
Chevron deference permits agencies to change positions (though it does not credit the
retroactive application of those changes). Id.
197 Id. at 673-75. Bradley's separation of powers argument is that Chevron effectuates
legislative intent to delegate responsibility to the executive. Id. Whether or not this
assumption about congressional intent is accurate, this justification serves formal ends.
Marbury v. Madison teaches that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
To avoid the formal objection to the court delegating judicial power to the executive,
administrative deference is often understood as Congress delegating lawmaking authority to
the executive. Congress, it is said, impliedly authorizes executive interpretations by
directing statutes with ambiguities to the administrative state. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan,
Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 25-28 (1983).
198 This assumption is debatable as well. See infra note 207 and accompanying text
(discussing Pearlstein on this point).
199 Bradley, supra note 192, at 673-75.
200 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 189, at 1173. Posner and Sunstein have explained the
differences between their proposal and Bradley's. See id. at 1177 n. 14.
201 Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE
L.J. 1230, 1230 (2006).
202 Id. at 1262-75. In particular, they worry about losing the disciplining effect of
international law on executive conduct. Id. And, relatedly, they worry that Posner and
Sunstein's proposal, under which the executive could run roughshod over international law
based on any perceived ambiguity in any congressional enactment, will have the effect of
discouraging congressional action in this area for fear of unintentionally opening such a
door. Id. at 1275-79.
203 Id. at 1245-49. Specifically, they argue that Chevron is justified because the executive
has superior expertise on certain administrative matters, but particularly in the context of
foreign affairs, it is not clear that the executive uses that expertise when making these
decisions. Id For one potential response to this criticism, see the discussion of Chevron Step
Two, infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
204 Jinks & Katyal, supra note 201, at 1253-56. Jinks and Katyal admit that Congress
could respond to "erroneous" executive interpretations just as they respond to "erroneous"
judicial decisions. They note, however, that the executive veto creates a formal hurdle to
those responses, and they predict an asymmetry in which "errors" against the executive are
much more likely to be remedied than "errors" in its favor - thus creating a ratchet toward
more executive power. Id
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lacked meaningful limits - what is "foreign-affairs law"? 20 5 They specifically
rejected deference when the executive seeks to step around a self-executing
treaty in the "executive-constraining zone. '206 Professor Deborah Pearlstein
joined the critics of foreign-affairs deference because, as she argued, the
"promise of Chevron is elusive": it is unstable and declining; 20 7 its functional
logic is questionable; 20 8 and it fails to answer the formal objection that the
judiciary alone is responsible for interpreting the law.20 9
Limiting foreign-affairs deference to extraterritoriality minimizes some
objections raised by critics without sacrificing the strengths pointed out by
proponents. Extraterritoriality deference does not accord any special (and
potentially undue) status to foreign-affairs questions; indeed, this approach is
the opposite of foreign-affairs exceptionalism since it merely asks that
geoambiguities in statutes assigned to administrative agencies get the same
treatment as other types of statutory ambiguities. On this basis, it is simply of
no moment whether foreign-affairs exceptionalism is justifiable.210 The
boundary problem that Jinks and Katyal identify is not an issue either.
Executive aggrandizement is a legitimate concern when contemplating a vast
205 Id. at 1257-62. As Jack Goldsmith put it, "[a]n important challenge for U.S. foreign
relations law is to rethink how its jurisdictional doctrines apply in a world in which 'foreign
relations' is no longer a distinctive category." Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign
Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REv. 1617, 1715 (1997). For further discussion of this
line-drawing problem in the context of foreign affairs federalism, see Ernest A. Young,
Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 139 (2001).
206 Jinks & Katyal, supra note 201, at 1256.
207 Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign
Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 783, 810-17 (2011). In short, she suggests that authors
writing about foreign affairs deference seem to assume that Chevron is stable and robust,
while in fact it is neither. Id.
208 Id. at 817-21. Pearlstein rejects Posner and Sunstein because she rejects foreign
affairs exceptionalism, and she is dubious that political accountability trumps values such as
individual rights. Id.
209 Id. at 821-24. Pearlstein identified what she calls a "persistent formal dilemma," the
same Marbury problem noted above, supra note 207, and one that she believes is not
resolved by foreign affairs deference proponents. In contrast to existing faithful-agent and
instrumental theories of judicial power, Pearlstein argues for an equilibrium theory where
the courts should adopt normative canons over Chevron to avoid a reduction of (or bar to)
one branch's role in the interbranch interpretive debate or to avoid an accretion of power in
one branch over the others. Pearlstein, supra note 207, at 824-51. For example, she worries
about allowing the executive branch to take the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF) and use it to ignore international law. Id. at 801-07, 842-50. As discussed below,
the extraterritoriality question swims in different waters from the AUMF - the issue here is
narrowly tailored to the geographic reach of statutes, limited to cases of congressional
silence, and bounded in various other ways.
210 One might call this a transsubstantive rule for administrative cases.
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regime of executive deference, but in the limited context of interpreting this
small set of statutes only with respect to their geographic scope, the risk of
overreach is simply not that substantial. And since many of these regulatory
statutes target concentrated interests,211 it seems likely that those interests will
have access to the executive's interpretative process (and any legislative
process that might follow an adverse administrative determination). 2 12
Turning to the affirmative case for deference, the classic justifications for
administrative deference are political accountability and agency expertise.
Both feature in the original Chevron opinion, 2 13 and both have a place in the
extraterritoriality context. With respect to democratic accountability,
administrative agencies are at least indirectly responsible to the people as part
of the executive branch. As such, the public policy choices of agencies,
including choices with respect to the geographic reach of statutes, are subject
to the democratic process. This political accountability highlights how
administrative cases differ from civil or criminal ones, and it places
extraterritorial administrative determinations in the same class as other
administrative questions. 21 4
With respect to expertise, agencies interpret statutes within their zones of
competence. In Chevron, it was the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
that offered a definition of a "stationary source" under the Clean Air Act, and
EPA has experience with air-quality issues. 215 If the Clean Air Act were
ambiguous on geographic reach, an administrative definition of a term like
"statutory source" could include a geographic element: "a stationary source is
any [... ] within the territory of the United States" or "a stationary source is
211 William Eskridge suggests that the presumption against extraterritoriality favors
multinational corporations. ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 118, at 275-79.
212 Recall that Jinks and Katyal worry about a ratchet, but these factors suggest that
worry is less acute with respect to extraterritoriality. Jinks & Katyal, supra note 201, at
1255.
213 As the Court explained in Chevron:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the
Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but
not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to
which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of
that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy
to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices - resolving the competing interests which
Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved
by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday
realities.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
214 Admittedly, the public is not monitoring every single agency determination, but
especially because these questions affect concentrated interests, see supra note 211, the case
for accountability is at least plausible here.
215 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
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any [... ] anywhere in the world. '216 EPA remains a repository of expertise on
the environmental aspects of this issue, and EPA has access to the expertise of
the State Department, foreign governments, and other sources that may provide
additional knowledge of international law and foreign relations concerns
relevant to the statute's reach.
Separation of powers and due process also favor a deference regime. The
structural case for deference is both formal and functional. Administrative
deference is best understood not as a delegation of law-interpreting authority
from the courts to the executive, but instead as a delegation of lawmaking
authority from Congress to the executive.217 This account responds to formal
objections like Pearlstein's, and it has functional consequences as well. The
executive has experience in the substantive issues raised by these statutes and
in the international-relations questions embedded in geoambiguity. 218 So, for
example, when Congress declines to specify whether an environmental statute
applies extraterritorially, there is a functional case for delegating that choice to
an agency with environmental expertise and to a branch with international-
relations competence.
Due process also supports a different approach in administrative cases. In
short, the existence of an ex ante agency interpretation minimizes the potential
notice problem. As mentioned earlier, putative lawbreakers likely do not sift
through the U.S. Code to determine whether their extraterritorial conduct will
be covered, and they likely do not scour the Code of Federal Regulations, the
Federal Register, or agency adjudication reports either. But to the extent the
fiction of notice is respected,219 administrative notice should be sufficient.
Moreover, formal interpretive statements do not fall out of the sky; the agency
must have undertaken some formal process to produce them. This Section will
return to the requirements of that process later, but for the moment it is only
necessary to observe that, unlike in the private civil case, a branch of the U.S.
government directed by Congress to consider the statute applied some process
to the extraterritoriality question. The regulated entity will have some access to
this process, and the process will be managed by an agency with some
expertise in the subject matter and some democratic accountability.
The foregoing paragraphs have explained extraterritoriality deference
generally, but why rely on Chevron as the vehicle for that deference? What
about those who say that Chevron is unstable and narrowing? 220 With respect
to its scope, although the courts may have narrowed the situations to which
Chevron applies, the extraterritoriality question is exactly the sort of statutory
ambiguity for which the doctrine was designed - situations in which there is a
216 For an example of a geoambiguous environmental statute, see Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581-89 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
217 See supra note 197.
218 See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
219 See supra note 180.
221 See supra note 207.
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reasonable basis for concluding that Congress delegated the issue to the
enforcing branch, and for which an executive solution manifests accountability
and expertise (on the substantive issue and on international affairs). With
respect to Chevron's stability, the easy answer would be that extraterritoriality
should be accorded whatever deference that courts typically apply - whether
that is Chevron or something else. And, because the case for foreign-affairs
exceptionalism in extraterritoriality is not particularly strong, I likely would
support relegating extraterritoriality to "normal" status in the prevailing
interpretative regime. There are, however, particular features of the current
approach that prove well suited for extraterritoriality, and it is to those features
that this Article now turns.
In its original incarnation, Chevron deference is a two-step process. Step
One asks whether Congress has clearly spoken to the issue; as with the
presumption, the court "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress. '22' If the statute is ambiguous (here, geoambiguous), then Step
Two asks whether the agency's proffered interpretation is "permissible." 222 If
the statute is ambiguous and the interpretation permissible, then the agency's
view holds. In cases following Chevron, the Court has limited the situations in
which Chevron may apply, generally (though not entirely) limiting Chevron to
cases where Congress has delegated lawmaking power to the executive and
where the executive has exercised that power in interpreting the statute.223 This
so-called Step Zero cabins the Chevron doctrine, for example, by excluding
executive litigating positions from the stable of interpretation to which
deference is due.224
The structure of Chevron links up with the values supposedly underlying the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Step Zero ensures that notice and due
process are protected; there is no notice benefit from an ex post litigating
position, and Step Zero accordingly limits deference in those cases. Step One
is also significant. Where Congress has answered the question unambiguously,
the weighing of the underlying values is best left to Congress for substantive
221 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
222 Id.
223 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217-22 (2002) (discussing when Chevron
applies); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221, 226-34 (2001) (denying Chevron
deference where Congress did not intend the agency's rules to exert force of law);
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000) (denying Chevron deference to the
Department of Labor's opinion letter); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 838-52 (2001) (surveying the types of agency
interpretations to which courts apply Chevron deference). See generally Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006) (discussing whether Chevron applies a
separate "Step Zero" inquiry).
224 See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) ("We have
never applied [Chevron deference] to agency litigating positions that are wholly
unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.").
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and structural reasons. But where Congress has left that weighing undone (Step
One), and where Congress has delegated that weighing to the executive (Step
Zero), the executive fills the void.
Another important aspect of the operation of Chevron is the existence of
certain background rules that seem to trump its application.225 Two are
important for present purposes: the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and the
presumption against implied repeal.226  First, courts discount agency
interpretations that create serious questions about a statute's constitutionality -
the constitutional avoidance canon "trumps" the Chevron doctrine.2 27 This
limitation should allay some concerns about executive overreach; and to the
extent that the courts ever adopt constitutional limits on prescriptive
jurisdiction,228 those limits would supersede contrary executive action. Second,
the presumption against implied repeal of a federal statute229 seemingly trumps
Chevron as well.230 Importantly, this same rule would seem to apply to self-
executing treaties, 231 which resolves Jinks and Katyal's concern about the
executive unilaterally breaching these core elements of international law. No
225 These background rules have, at times, been referred to as nondelegation canons. See
John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SuP. CT.
REv. 223; Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1721 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315
(2000).
226 A third such rule is the antiretroactivity principle. See Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208
("[C]ongressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have
retroactive effect unless their language requires this result."). In the parlance of Chevron,
these rules are "traditional tools of statutory construction" that render a statute unambiguous
at Step One. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
227 See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-78 (1988) (refusing to construe a statute in a way that would
raise First Amendment questions).
228 See supra note 104 (collecting sources examining due process and exterritorial
legislation).
229 See, e.g., United States v. United Cont'l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976) ("It is,
of course, a cardinal principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored.").
230 The Ninth Circuit so held expressly in, among others, Lujan-Armendariz v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 222 F.3d 728, 749 (9th Cir. 2000). The Supreme
Court implied as much in FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, 537 U.S. 293
(2003), rejecting the agency's interpretation of one statute (the Communications Act)
because it conflicted with the plain language of another (the Bankruptcy Code). Id. at 304
("[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a
clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective."
(quoting J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143-44
(2001))).
231 Self-executing treaties, like statutes, are supreme U.S. law. For examples of courts
requiring express abrogation of treaty provisions, see Turley, supra note 134, at 227-28.
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such issue would exist if Chevron is applied in concert with this anti-implied-
repeal rule.232
These trumping canons make Chevron a better fit for extraterritoriality, but
they also invite the question: should the presumption against extraterritoriality
trump Chevron too? Indeed, Cass Sunstein suggested that the presumption
against extraterritoriality trumps Chevron,233 and Justice Scalia implied as
much in Aramco.2 34 The most straightforward response is that, for the reasons
stated in Part I, the presumption against extraterritoriality should be
decanonized. In other words, even if every interpretative canon trumped
Chevron, because there should be no generalizable presumption against
extraterritoriality, it is meaningless to say it trumps Chevron.
Even without decanonization, though, there are reasons to think that the
presumption against extraterritoriality should not trump Chevron. As
mentioned above, courts trump Chevron with rules such as the constitutional
avoidance canon, the antiretroactivity presumption, and the presumption
against implied repeal. 235 These rules are constitutionally inspired canons,
reflecting the courts' important role in safeguarding constitutional values.
236
The presumption against extraterritoriality has a different origin - it is not a
constitutionally inspired rule, but instead it is a rule designed to promote policy
goals and to approximate legislative intent. This type of canon, unlike its
constitutionally inspired cousins, should not trump the considered judgment of
an executive agency assigned to implement the statute. Separation of powers, a
constitutionally inspired principle in its own right, also supports this view.
Canons like the presumption against extraterritoriality reflect the courts'
modesty with respect to the legislative-judicial division of authority; they do
not help explain the legislative-executive division that is at play in Chevron.237
Given Chevron's requirement that Congress has delegated (perhaps implicitly)
authority to the executive, a modest judiciary should honor this delegation
rather than trump it for judicially divined policy reasons.
232 This rule is an element of Bradley's approach to foreign affairs Chevron, but because
Posner and Sunstein promote a broader rule, it is not available to them to party Jinks and
Katyal. See Bradley, supra note 192, at 688-90.
233 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071,
2114-15 (1990); Sunstein, supra note 225, at 333.
234 499 U.S. 244, 256-58 (1991) (rejecting EEOC's position).
235 See supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text (exploring background rules that
trump Chevron's application).
236 See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 124, at 598. One could say the same
about the presumption against preemption and the rule of lenity, and indeed Professor
Sunstein says exactly that. Sunstein, supra note 225, at 331-32.
237 See supra note 197 (indicating Chevron's effectuation of legislative deference to the
executive).
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The harder case, it turns out, is Charming Betsy.238 The reasons offered
earlier in this Article for Charming Betsy in civil litigation also could be
mustered to argue that Charming Betsy should trump Chevron.239 Squaring
these two doctrines, though, depends on the type of international law on which
Charming Betsy relies. Self-executing treaties and "executed" non-self-
executing treaties are international law, but they do not need the protection of
Charming Betsy because of the rule against implied repeal; Chevron, therefore,
will not touch these elements of international law that are supreme U.S. law.240
The (constitutionally inspired) structural logic for this approach is
straightforward: unless we require legislative action to revise or repeal a
Senate-ratified treaty, the executive has an opening for an end run around the
treaty-ratification process. Customary international law is also accorded
Charming Betsy status, but for as much value as may be gained from enforcing
customary norms in U.S. courts, it is undeniable that customary international
law is different from self-executing-treaty law. There is no formal legislative
role in customary international lawmaking, so allowing Chevron to trump
customary law does not invite executive end runs around otherwise-necessary
legislative action. And, perhaps for these structural reasons, there is no
preference against implied repeal of customary international law. Non-self-
executing treaties represent the hardest case: there is a structural senatorial role
that demands some respect, 24 1 but they lack the enforceable status of self-
executing treaties.242 To my mind, the structural case wins out - the anti-
implied-repeal rule should apply here as well - but I concede that this is a close
case.
To recapitulate briefly, the Charming Betsy canon does not trump Chevron,
but at least some types of international law (self-executing treaties and perhaps
non-self-executing treaties) are shielded from Chevron by the presumption
against implied repeal. This solution is structurally justified and presents a
clear and manageable approach. Stopping here would be a reasonable solution
and one this author would endorse over the status quo.
That being said, there is one more potential piece to puzzle - one that
admittedly accepts some unpredictability in order to acquire some normative
238 For better or worse, "[s]ince Erie, the Supreme Court has never invoked the
Charming Betsy canon to decide a case against the Executive." Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619
F.3d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
239 See supra Part II.A.
240 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ").
241 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have power, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur .. "); see also Crootof, supra note 161.
242 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111(3); Crootof, supra note 161, at 1806-18.
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benefits. In thinking generally about the relationship between normative
canons and Chevron, Professor Kenneth Bamberger rejected categorical
approaches in which canons trump Chevron or Chevron trumps canons.
Instead, he favored a context-sensitive solution: normative canons should play
a role in Chevron Step Two, where courts must assess whether the agency's
interpretation is "permissible. '243 Dramatically simplifying Bamberger's
proposal, part of the permissibility inquiry of Step Two asks whether the
agency considered the relevant normative canon and its underlying
principles. 244 Bamberger's Step Two is a natural home for Charming Betsy and
international law. If an agency offers an interpretation that violates customary
international law - which is within the power of Congress to authorize and
without the power of the courts to enforce directly - the court could ask
whether the agency considered and weighed the relevant international law
norm. 245 This approach has the benefits of maintaining the courts' role in
foreign-affairs law and encouraging the agencies to use the expertise that
justifies the deference in the first place. Though this proposal increases
decisional costs, those costs seem worth paying.246 If not, though, the
foregoing approach remains viable.
Because of the structural role of the executive and the benefits of its
announced interpretations, this Article carves out from the default civil rule
those statutes in which Congress has delegated authority to the executive: if a
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to its extraterritoriality, and if
Congress has explicitly or implicitly delegated responsibility for that statute to
an administrative agency, the agency's ex ante interpretation is valid if it is a
permissible construction of the statute.
III. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Part II of this Article offers replacements for the presumption against
extraterritoriality in civil, criminal, and administrative cases to which that rule
traditionally has been applied. This Part addresses a different class of cases -
tort suits filed for violations of international law under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS), a jurisdictional statute that grants federal courts subject matter
jurisdiction over those cases. Although there are good reasons to think that the
presumption against extraterritoriality should not apply to ATS cases, the
243 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 111-23 (2008).
244 Id. at 118-21.
245 It would be excessive to list all of the different indicia of proper consideration of
international law. A few examples, though, might include solicitation of the views of the
State Department; receipt and response to the views of foreign states (or foreign entities); a
formal discussion of the international law issues at stake; or an acknowledgement that
international law was considered.
246 See Bamberger, supra note 243, at 84-107 (making the case for this trade off
generally); supra Part II.A (evaluating Charming Betsy).
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Supreme Court has imported this statutory canon of interpretation into ATS
jurisprudence. For that reason, and because some of the same underlying issues
arise in ATS cases as in other extraterritorial litigation, it is useful to consider
it here.
The ATS, part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, provides that "[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." 247 Since the 1970s, the ATS has been used by private parties and
human rights organizations to pursue international law claims in U.S. courts. 248
Recent cases have focused on the geographic reach of the ATS. In 2013, the
Supreme Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to ATS cases
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., concluding that the ATS applies only
to extraterritorial cases that touch and concern the territory of the United
States. 249  Chief Justice Roberts justified the presumption against
extraterritoriality in this case as avoiding "the danger of unwarranted judicial
interference in the conduct of foreign policy. 250
The application of the presumption to an ATS case was not out of nowhere,
but it did not have a long pedigree. Although at one time the United States
government argued that the presumption against extraterritoriality should limit
the ATS,251 and an occasional judge adopted this view,252 courts did not
endorse the application of the presumption to the ATS before Kiobel. In Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, for example, the Supreme Court was presented with the
argument that the presumption limits the ATS, and not a single Justice
endorsed it.2 53 And many extraterritorial ATS cases had been litigated in
federal courts. 254
247 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
248 See generally Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and
the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REv. 445 (2011); Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute
and Article 111, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587 (2002); Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute
and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (1989); Anthony
D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 62
(1988); William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some
Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687 (2002).
249 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
250 Id. at 1664.
251 See, e.g., Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial
Support of Affirmance at 21 n.ll, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter U.S.
Supplemental Brief] (acknowledging the United States' change in position); Brief for the
United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 46-50, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 182581, at *46-50 (adopting this position).
252 E.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 808-11 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 74-81 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting).
253 See generally Sosa, 542 U.S. 692. As noted earlier, the United States government
presented this position to the Supreme Court. See Brief for the United States as Respondent
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There are sound doctrinal reasons that the presumption against
extraterritoriality should not apply to ATS cases. Unlike the statutes to which
the presumption has been applied, the ATS is a "strictly jurisdictional"
statute. 255 The presumption against extraterritoriality never had been applied to
a jurisdictional statute prior to Kiobel.256 Moreover, the torts for which the
ATS grants jurisdiction are common law causes of action, not statutory ones, 257
and the presumption is explicitly a tool of divining congressional intent in
substantive statutes.258 The ATS is simply not the type of statute to which the
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 251.
254 According to a recent Ninth Circuit decision:
[W]e [previously] considered an ATS claim based on torture that took place in the
Philippines. We categorically rejected the argument that the ATS applies only to torts
committed in this country. We said, "we are constrained by what § 1350 shows on its
face: no limitations as to the citizenship of the defendant, or the locus of the injury." In
fact, the seminal and most widely respected applications of the statute relate to conduct
that took place outside the United States. The D.C. Circuit has recently concluded that
there is no bar to the ATS's applicability to foreign conduct because the Supreme Court
in Sosa did not disapprove these seminal decisions and Congress, in enacting the
Torture Victim Protection Act, implicitly ratified such law suits.
Sarei, 671 F.3d at 744-45 (internal citations omitted).
255 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.
256 See William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation and the Prescriptive Jurisdiction
Fallacy, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 35,45 (2010). As the D.C. Circuit explained:
As a jurisdictional statute, [the ATS] would apply extraterritorially only if Congress
were to establish U.S. district courts in foreign countries. To say that a court is
applying the ATS extraterritorially when it hears an action such as appellants have
brought makes no more sense than saying that a court is applying 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the
federal question statute, extraterritorially when it hears a TVPA claim brought by a
U.S. citizen based on torture in a foreign country.Thus, the question here is not whether
the ATS applies extraterritorially but is instead whether the common law causes of
action that federal courts recognize in ATS lawsuits may extend to harm to aliens
occurring in foreign countries.
Doe, 654 F.3d at 23; see also Sarei, 671 F.3d at 746 ("[T]he ATS is a jurisdictional statute;
federal courts frequently exercise jurisdiction with regard to matters occurring out of the
country .... "); United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2000) (indicating,
outside of the context of the ATS, that "jurisdictional statutes inherently present the question
of how far Congress wishes U.S. law to extend. There is therefore no reason to presume that
Congress did, or did not, mean to act extraterritorially"); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Common law courts of general jurisdiction regularly [have]
adjudicate[d] transitory tort claims between individuals over whom they exercise personal
jurisdiction, wherever the tort occurred.").
257 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (indicating that the ATS was "enacted on the understanding that
the common law would provide a cause of action"); id at 732 (providing that causes of
action under the ATS must be "claims under federal common law").
258 For the same reasons, the presumption against extraterritoriality has no place in
Bivens cases. In Bivens, the Supreme Court authorized a lawsuit against federal officials in
their personal capacity arising out of violations of the Constitution. Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). In many cases since,
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presumption had been applied, not to mention the various historical arguments
that would seem to undermine the presumption's role with respect to this
statute. 259 But the Supreme Court sees the issue differently, so if this Article
seeks to replace the presumption in all its forms, the ATS must be addressed as
well.
In shaping the common law causes of action in ATS cases, do any of the
three frames from Part II work? In other words, are ATS cases similar enough
to any of these three classes of cases to merit overlapping consideration? We
can quickly dispense with two-thirds of Part II because the ATS is not a
criminal statute nor has Congress delegated its management to the executive
branch.260 But the Charming Betsy rule, and its use of international law as an
interpretative guide, may have something to say about the ATS. Again, the
the courts have engaged in making federal common law to recognize constitutional torts
against federal officials. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (indicating that Bivens cases employed the Court's "common-law powers to
create causes of action"). Particularly in the context of the war on terror, courts have
considered Bivens claims for extraterritorial conduct by U.S. government officials and
contractors. See James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and
Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 119-20 (2009) (discussing Bivens claims
related to detention and extraordinary rendition); Carlos M. Vazquez & Stephen I. Vladeck,
State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 509,
518-30 (2013) (examining Bivens in the context of national security). See generally Vance
v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C.
Cir. 2012); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 769-74 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Arar v. Ashcrofl, 585
F.3d 559, 569-81 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc). Bivens cases, like ATS cases, call for courts to
apply common law, so there is no substantive statute to which the presumption would apply
(other than the jurisdictional grant).
259 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1672 (2013)
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The ATS, however, was enacted with 'foreign
matters' in mind."); Sarei, 671 F.3d at 745; Dodge, supra note 256, at 45 ("As a historical
matter, it is quite clear that the presumption against extraterritoriality was not understood to
apply to the ATS.").
260 See Bradley, supra note 192, at 680-81. As pointed out by Professor Ingrid Wuerth,
however, there is some support in Sosa and Kiobel for consideration of executive branch
views in ATS cases. See Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme
Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 601 (2013); see also Kiobel, 133 S. Ct.
at 1671, 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21 (noting
cases in which there is "a strong argument that federal courts should give serious weight to
the Executive Branch's view of the case's impact on foreign policy"). This approach is
problematic for formal and functional reasons. Formally, even the most generous reader of
congressional intent can find no delegation to the executive in the text or purpose of the
ATS. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States."). Functionally, many of the virtues of deference regimes like
Chevron derive from the ex ante, public, non-case-specific "rulemaking" that precedes court
deference. See supra Part II.C. None of that would be present here.
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Charming Betsy canon is about statutory interpretation, so it is not a perfect fit
for common law in ATS cases, but there are ways in which international law
can help guide courts.
First, and most obviously, the ATS grants jurisdiction for law-of-nations
torts, expressly invoking international law with respect to the substantive
causes of action in these cases.261 This connection is congressionally required
and unambiguous, 262 and the Supreme Court has required not just any
connection to international law, but one that exhibits "definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations. '263
Less obviously, when adjudicating international law causes of action, courts
should consult international jurisdictional law.264 As discussed with respect to
civil statutes, international law of prescriptive jurisdiction demarcates the reach
of a state's law. Years before Kiobel, Professor Ramsey similarly argued that
common law under the ATS should get the same treatment as statutory law -
which would include prescriptive jurisdictional limits via Charming Betsy.2 65
Professor Dodge responded to Ramsey, calling this the "prescriptive
jurisdiction fallacy" of the ATS; in his view, the courts are not subject to
prescriptive jurisdictional rules because they are not making substantive law,
only applying it.266 Dodge is right in the formal sense, but the law of
prescriptive jurisdiction is not a complete non sequitor. There is, especially in
the post-Erie world, something lawmaking-like in what federal courts do when
they apply (recognize, create, discover) common law rules. Moreover, as
261 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
262 Certainly there can be debates about what constitutes the law of nations, but there is
no doubt that 28 U.S.C. § 1350 refers to whatever that phrase entails.
263 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
264 In his concurring opinion in Kiobel, Justice Breyer sought inspiration from
"international jurisdictional norms," by which he meant the law of prescriptive jurisdiction.
See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671-78 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Breyer
looked to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law for the position that the ATS
should provide jurisdiction for law-of-nations tort claims based on conduct in the United
States, against U.S. nationals, or where "the defendant's conduct substantially and adversely
affects an important American national interest." Id. at 1671. This approach more closely
tracks international law than the majority, but it too falls short. In spirit, it is notable that
Justice Breyer subsumed the international law roots of these jurisdictional rules into an
analysis of "American national interest." Id. In substance, it is also notable that this opinion
(added to the others) provided nine votes for a rejection of universal jurisdiction under the
international law of prescriptive jurisdiction. See generally Kenneth Anderson, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum: The Alien Tort Statute's Jurisdictional Universalism in Retreat,
2013 SuP. CT. REv. 149.
265 Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights
Litigation, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 271, 296-97 (2009).
266 Dodge, supra note 256, at 37. Dodge acknowledged that the international law of
adjudicatory jurisdiction would be more appropriate, but he did not discuss its limits. See
infra note 271.
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courts grope for limits on the ATS - from Sosa's call for "vigilant
doorkeeping 267 to the various opinions in Kiobe2 68 - reliance on the
international law of prescriptive jurisdiction may be a reasonable alternative.
The international law of prescriptive jurisdiction provides coherent limits, and
they are limits blessed by the international community and the United States. 69
Rather than invoking the inapplicable and unjustified presumption against
extraterritoriality in ATS cases, perhaps taking the international law of
prescriptive jurisdiction slightly out of context is an option worth considering
as courts seek to limit the ATS.2
70
In both this Part and the previous discussion of international jurisdictional
law, the focus has been on prescriptive jurisdiction. And indeed, concerns
about the reach of ATS cases have been voiced in the language of prescriptive
jurisdiction - Justices Roberts and Breyer both issued opinions seeking to
apply limits to the prescriptive reach of the causes of action under the ATS.
However, it is not clear that these Justices truly are concerned with the content
of ATS-enforceable norms, which the Court has limited to causes of action
with such specificity and international acceptance that they should not upset
foreign relations. Instead, the underlying concern may in fact have been
whether a foreign court, rather than a U.S. court, should adjudicate law-of-
267 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (arguing that, with respect to judicial recognition of "actionable
international norms... the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping").
268 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (proposing limits on the ATS).
269 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031
(discussing the sources of international law). Some scholars have suggested that we have
enough limits in current law: personal jurisdiction, the political question doctrine, the act of
state doctrine, comity, and forum non conveniens. E.g., Brief of Professors of Civil
Procedure and Federal Courts as Amici Curiae on Reargument in Support of Petitioners at 1,
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491); see also U.S. Supplemental Brief, supra note 251, at
22; Supplemental Brief of Yale Law School Center for Global Legal Challenges as Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 14-17, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491)
[hereinafter Yale Supplemental Brief]. But some of these limits are unpredictable, see supra
note 158 (regarding comity), and none expressly incorporates international jurisdictional
law.
270 One potential countervailing consideration is federalism. A narrow interpretation of
the ATS may lead to an increase in international tort cases filed in state courts. See Donald
Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational
Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709 (2012). And applying federal "procedural common law" limits
to federal court actions will not limit analogous state court cases. See Amy Coney Barrett,
Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REv. 813, 815 (2008). Even post-Erie, foreign affairs
is an area in which federal common law is understood as appropriate, reflecting the elevated
role of the federal government in foreign affairs vis-A-vis the states. Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964) (discussing the need for "federal judge-made
law" to deal with issues affecting international relations). Perhaps, therefore, a broad
interpretation of the ATS is justified on vertical federalism grounds. This subject is beyond
the scope of this Article, but one that calls out for further study. For a related argument in
the context of Bivens, see Vazquez & Vladeck, supra note 258, at 524-30.
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nations claims with limited connections to the United States. This concern is a
closer match to "adjudicatory jurisdiction," which defines whom courts can
bring within their judicial process.271 The international law of adjudicatory
jurisdiction, therefore, may be an important source for limits in international
law cases under the ATS. Notably, the international law of adjudicatory
jurisdiction is not coextensive with the U.S. law of personal jurisdiction; for
example, "tag service" satisfies personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts,272 but is
insufficient under international adjudicatory jurisdiction law. 273 "General
jurisdiction" also may be more limited under international law than U.S.
law.274 Courts, therefore, could require ATS cases to comply with both U.S.
rules on personal jurisdiction and international rules on adjudicatory
jurisdiction. By applying international prescriptive and adjudicatory
jurisdictional limits, U.S. courts will ensure that cases brought under the ATS
have sufficient connection to the United States, and they will measure this
connection through international jurisdictional rules.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has been twofold: to argue against the
presumption against extraterritoriality and to identify existing rules to step up
in its stead. Replacing the presumption with a Charming Betsy rule for civil
cases, a rule of lenity for criminal cases, and Chevron deference for
271 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
401(b) (1986) (defining the jurisdiction to adjudicate as the power "to subject persons or
things to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in criminal
proceedings, whether or not the state is a party to the proceedings"); id. §§ 421-423 (setting
out the rules for adjudicatory jurisdiction). Interestingly, numerous scholars arguing for
expansive ATS liability acknowledge that the international law of adjudicatory jurisdiction
is relevant, yet they do not focus on what limits it might place on these cases. See, e.g., Yale
Supplemental Brief, supra note 269, at 6-9; Dodge, supra note 256, at 38-44. Other
doctrines such as venue and abstention also may have a role to play here. See supra note
269.
272 E.g., Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990) (upholding
California's "tag" service of process).
273 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
421 cmt. e (1986) ("'Tag' jurisdiction, i.e., jurisdiction based on service of process on a
person only transitorily in the territory of the state, is not generally acceptable under
international law."). Interestingly, human rights advocates opposed attempts to codify an
international law rejection of tag service during negotiations regarding the Hague Judgments
Convention. KOH, supra note 17, at 151 ("Although drafts of the Hague Convention...
initially sought to limit this form of jurisdiction, human rights advocates opposed that
limitation as a threat to much of the transnational public law litigation brought against
foreign human rights violators ... ").
274 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
421 (1986).
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administrative cases better serves the principles that underlie the presumption,
which are in themselves laudable goals for transnational legal rules.
Lurking behind these two purposes is a broader question: Is
extraterritoriality special? The answer, it seems, is yes and no. From the
perspective of pure statutory interpretation, the approach advocated in Part II
of this Article - which applies extant rules of statutory interpretation to
familiar situations - suggests that extraterritoriality is not special. 275
Interpreting an ambiguous statute in light of background rules is commonplace
for courts, and the substance of the rules suggested here are not unique to the
question of a statute's geographic reach. The foreign-affairs component of
these cases does not elevate them into another category, nor is there an
outsized role for the executive in these cases simply because they touch on
issues outside the territory of the United States.276 To put it another way, civil,
criminal, and administrative cases are more different from each other than
territorial ambiguities are different from other types of statutory
indeterminacies.
There are, however, at least a few ways that these cases are special. First, as
was made clear in the discussion of Charming Betsy, cases implicating the
geographic reach of U.S. statutes implicate international law. Customary
international law and non-self-executing treaties do not create directly
enforceable rights in U.S. courts, yet the Charming Betsy doctrine gives them a
role to play - a role that is particularly significant in the case of geoambiguous
statutes, since the law of prescriptive jurisdiction must be consulted in these
cases. Counterintuitively, removing a rule supposedly inspired by international
law (the presumption against extraterritoriality) could have the effect of
making international law more central to U.S. courts' work.
Second, the United States has a separate executive department assigned
responsibility for diplomacy and foreign affairs. The State Department has a
role to play in the administrative process, and the approach to Chevron Step
Two discussed previously suggests that the executive might have to take an
275 The scholarly alternatives discussed at the start of Part II treat extraterritoriality as
special on this metric, but for the reasons discussed here and above, that treatment is not
justified.
276 Professor Daniel Abebe, for example, suggested that the level of executive deference
in foreign affairs should be related to the level of "external constraints," which can be
approximated by the ability of other powerful states to balance the United States. The
stronger the external constraints, the more deference by the courts; but if external constraints
are weak, then the foreign affairs law (less deferentially) should constrain executive
authority. Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law, 49 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 1, 51-53 (2013). Assuming arguendo that Abebe's sliding scale is appropriate, we
still must define which "foreign affairs" questions deserve special treatment - the same
problem facing Posner and Sunstein. See supra note 201-04 and accompanying text. For
reasons explained in this Article, extraterritoriality questions, though "foreign," do not.
(Vol. 94:1
REPLACING THE PRESUMPTION
institutional approach to determining the reach of geoambiguous statutes that
differs from its approach to other types of statutory ambiguities. 277
Last, the types of cases discussed in this Article are special because, to a
large extent, the courts' decisions function not only as decisions about the
meaning of statutes but also as an allocative mechanism. 278 As mentioned in
the context of criminal law, where conduct is illegal in multiple states, the rule
of lenity combines with an extradition regime to form a principle for assigning
criminal cases to appropriate jurisdictions. Similarly, where civil conduct is
regulated in multiple states, international jurisdictional law acts to assign
responsibility to different jurisdictions based on their connections to the case.
This allocative function is different from the substantive questions in statutory
interpretation. And, because the international system lacks the full-faith-and-
credit rules of the United States, 279 these allocative questions are particularly
thorny. This is why it is important, where possible, to rely on international law
to define the allocative rules. Because international law reflects the collective
judgment and agreement of the states, it is international law (specifically the
international jurisdictional law) that has the best chance of rationalizing the
transnational legal system.
277 See supra Part II.C.
278 The allocative mechanism also has been referred to as "judicial equilibration." See
Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress
in National Law, 49 AM. J. CoMP. L. 203, 219-35 (2001) (discussing the promise of the
since-abandoned Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments).
279 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
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